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We comprehensively analyze standalone ratings that measure a bank’s intrinsic financial strength 
and abstract from sovereign support. We focus on a defining event on July 20, 2011, when Fitch 
Ratings refined their standalone ratings from a 9-point to a 21-point scale. This refinement did 
not affect Fitch’s all-in ratings, which measure default risk taking into account sovereign support. 
The event allows us to investigate if markets react when a credit rating agency publicly releases 
information about banks without changing its estimates of banks’ default risk. We find that 
shareholders rewarded banks receiving positive rating surprises. We also find that Fitch used the 
refinement to inflate ratings, in particular for large banks and banks outside North America. 
 
Keywords: banks, credit ratings, standalone ratings, ratings catering, stock reaction. 
JEL Classifications: G21, G14, G15. 
 
 
 “The global financial crisis and ongoing stress in the capital markets have increased 
market participants’ appetite for clear and credible assessments of the credit risks of banks 
worldwide. Regulatory changes designed to limit state support for banks strengthen the 
demand for a clear perspective on a bank’s intrinsic financial strength and the extent to 
which it may benefit from support.” 
Fitch Ratings, March 7, 2011 
 
Standalone ratings provide an assessment of banks’ intrinsic financial strength. For these ratings, 
rating agencies abstract from any extraordinary support that a bank may receive from the home 
country sovereign or a parent company. Combining bank standalone ratings with estimates of the 
probability and extent of extraordinary support delivers all-in ratings, which are the measure of 
default risk commonly given to non-financial entities and monitored by creditors. 
The recent crisis highlighted the importance of distinguishing between internal and 
external sources of financial strength, particularly for shareholders who were diluted or wiped out 
when banks were recapitalized or nationalized. Post-crisis, market participants have demanded 
greater transparency on the importance given to sovereign support, which is based on the credit 
rating agency’s opinion and not the strength of the bank’s balance sheet. Bank regulators have 
also considered standalone ratings for risk weighting interbank exposures (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (2015)).1 Yet despite this increased prominence for investors and 
policymakers alike, bank standalone ratings are little studied in academic research. 
In this paper we address this gap in the literature by comprehensively analyzing bank 
standalone ratings around a defining event on July 20, 2011. On that date, Fitch Ratings 
published refined standalone ratings for all the banks in its rating universe. These new ratings, 
                                                 
1 At the time of the ratings transition in July of 2011, there was no indication that bank standalone ratings could 
become a driver of regulatory risk weights. Thus, the refinement of Fitch’s standalone ratings revealed information 





called “Viability Ratings”, were reported on the standard 21-point AAA scale, rather than on the 
coarser 9-point scale adopted by Fitch when it acquired IBCA in 1976.2 
Four features of this event are crucial for our analysis. First, the refinement in bank 
standalone ratings was announced on a single date for all banks rated by Fitch, and the 
announcement date was not known in advance. Second, Fitch stressed that the methodology for 
assessing banks’ standalone ratings was unchanged and that the new 21-point scale provided 
greater clarity about the inputs to this methodology (Fitch (2011b)). In effect, the refinement 
revealed Fitch’s ranking of banks that had previously shared the same coarse standalone rating. 
Third, Fitch stressed that bank all-in ratings were unaffected by this refinement in standalone 
ratings’ scale. Instead the refinement placed both standalone and all-in ratings on the same 21-
point scale, making them directly comparable for the first time. And fourth, Fitch clarified how a 
bank’s all-in rating depended on: (i) The corresponding standalone rating, and (ii) Fitch’s 
assessment of external support. 
Consistent with Fitch’s statement, bank all-in ratings did not change on July 20, 2011. 
Thus, we can study exclusively the public release of a rating agency’s information about the 
relative intrinsic financial strength of banks. This information may be particularly important for 
bank shareholders, as it relates to a bank’s franchise value, its competitive position, and the 
outlook for dividends and recapitalizations. 
Our focus on bank standalone credit ratings builds on prior research on credit rating 
refinements. Notable examples of this research are studies of the 1982 refinement of Moody’s 
ratings by Kliger and Sarig (2000), who examined the market reaction of stock and bond prices of 
                                                 
2 The 21-point scale employed for the all-in ratings features upper-case letters from “AAA” to “D”, while Viability 
Ratings use lower-case letters from “aaa” to “d”. Throughout the paper, we capitalize Fitch-specific terms (e.g., 





non-financial entities, and Tang (2009) who studied the impact on investment and firm value. We 
focus on a credit rating that is particularly important for banks, as there is no direct mapping from 
their intrinsic financial strength to their creditworthiness. 
Given that the rating refinement affected simultaneously the entire Fitch universe of bank 
ratings, it provides a setting to test for evidence of ratings inflation. Extant studies of inflation in 
all-in ratings distinguish two possible channels – ratings shopping and ratings catering.3 Ratings 
shopping describes a setting where an entity can solicit credit ratings from several ratings 
agencies, and then pay for the highest one (Faure-Grimaud et al. (2009); Skreta and Veldkamp 
(2009); Doherty et al. (2012); Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013); Farhi et al. (2013)). This channel is 
unlikely to have played a role in the event we study, as the refinement of standalone ratings 
affected the entire Fitch universe of banks simultaneously. The event was exogenous to 
individual banks, and there was no immediate opportunity for banks that felt disadvantaged to 
shop around. However, the refinement provided a rare opportunity for Fitch to re-adjust many 
ratings at the same time in order to cater to certain banks (Mathis et al. (2009); Becker and 
Milbourn (2011); Bolton et al. (2012); Baghai and Becker (2017)). We thus study whether the 
pattern of rating refinements is linked to bank characteristics that may proxy for potential future 
business with Fitch such as size, nationality, and past securitization business. In effect, we can 
singularly test for ratings catering, because ratings shopping cannot be present. 
We use a sample of 212 publicly-listed, widely-held banks from 39 countries. We develop 
benchmarks of what investors might have expected for the new 21-point standalone ratings on 
July 20, 2011. As these expectations are unobservable, we consider four possible benchmarks – 
two based on information available ex ante and two on ex post information. We thus measure 
                                                 
3 There is evidence that the SEC’s formal recognition in 1975 of Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch as 





four variants of rating surprises, each equal to the difference between the actual 21-point 
standalone rating and one of the four benchmarks. We explored using the standalone ratings from 
Moody’s Investor Services as a fifth benchmark. We were unable to develop this benchmark 
because – during the event we focus on – there was no clear mapping between the scale of 
Moody’s standalone ratings and that of the corresponding Fitch ratings.4 
We find evidence of higher than expected standalone ratings across our sample, as the 
distribution of rating surprises is positively-skewed and non-random. In our sample, positive 
rating surprises tend to be associated with larger bank size, stronger liquidity positions, lower 9-
point standalone ratings, and with banks headquartered outside North America. Interestingly, 
there is some evidence that banks experience more negative rating surprises when they have a 
higher share of past securitization business with Fitch and when a Fitch analyst is located in the 
same city as the bank’s headquarters. We thus find mixed evidence for ratings catering. 
Beyond drivers of the refined standalone ratings, we study whether Fitch’s release of 
additional information about banks – through the refinement of their standalone ratings – was 
useful to bank shareholders. For this analysis, we are motivated by two Fitch objectives for 
transitioning bank standalone ratings from the coarser “9-point” scale to the more granular “21-
point” scale (Fitch (2011a); Fitch (2011b)). First, the more granular scale was meant to provide 
greater clarity on Fitch’s assessments of banks relative intrinsic financial strength. For example, 
Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley were all rated “B/C” on the 9-point 
standalone rating scale. When the more granular 21-point ratings were released, Goldman Sachs 
received an “a+”, Morgan Stanley received an “a”, and Bank of America received an “a-“, 
                                                 
4 Moody’s ratings are available for 154 banks in our sample. Moody’s introduced bank standalone ratings in 1995 
but and started migrating them from a 13-point to a 21-point scale in mid-2011. Unlike in the case of Fitch’s 
refinement, this transition happened only gradually. Standard & Poor’s started publishing standalone ratings in the 





indicating that Fitch saw important differences in their intrinsic financial strength. We ask 
whether this information was valuable or not to bank shareholders. 
The second objective was to allow market participants to infer directly the importance of 
sovereign support in each bank’s measure of default risk. By stating both ratings on the same 21-
point scale, it became clear when the likelihood of sovereign support drove an all-in rating above 
the corresponding standalone rating. For example, Goldman Sachs` all-in rating of A+ was the 
same as its standalone rating, Morgan Stanley’s all-in rating of A was 1 notch higher due to 
sovereign support, and Bank of America’s all-in rating of A+ was 2 notches higher. In our 
analysis we thus ask whether bank shareholders reacted to Fitch’s assessment that the dependence 
of default risk on sovereign support differed across banks?5  
For a clean analysis of the impact of the ratings’ refinement on bank stock prices, it is 
desirable that no other information relevant for shareholders is released at the same time. Fitch 
disclosed the refinement of standalone ratings for its entire universe of banks on a single day in 
the middle of the summer. We are thus fairly certain that the event we study is not confounded by 
the release of equity analyst reports, bank earnings releases or financial statements. 
One concern is however that on the evening of Fitch’s disclosure, the European 
Commission circulated a proposal to tax Eurozone banks to fund the repurchase of outstanding 
Greek sovereign debt, prompting a late-night meeting between the French and German leaders. 
The proposed bank levy was dropped the following day.6 We address the potentially 
contaminating effect of these political events in two ways: by including regional dummies and by 
                                                 
5 We also study creditors’ reaction using credit default swap (CDS) spreads. We find no statistically significant 
reaction, but this finding is inconclusive, as the CDS sample comprises only 74 banks, i.e. it is almost three times 
smaller than the stock-price sample. These results are reported in Appendix A. We also explored using bank bond 
prices but could not find sufficiently comparable and liquid bank bonds. 
6 See “Sarkozy and Merkel in 11th hour talks” by Peter Spiegel and Quentin Peel, 20 July 2011, in The Financial 
Times, “Banks rise on demise of Sarkozy tax plan” by Neil Dennis, 21 July 2011, in The Financial Times, and the 





recalculating our results after excluding European banks. 
For the same sample of 212 banks, univariate tests provide initial evidence that positive 
rating surprises are associated with higher cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). Banks that 
received positive standalone-rating surprises broadly outperformed banks with negative surprises, 
by about 1.5 percentage points (pp) over the event window of two days before to two days after 
the event. In regressions with CARs as a dependent variable, the coefficient on rating surprises 
maintains its sign and statistical significance when we introduce region dummies and when we 
exclude European banks from the sample. This finding suggests that our results are robust to 
controlling for the potential stock-market impact of the European proposal. 
To dig deeper into the cross-sectional outperformance associated with positive rating 
surprises, we include additional bank-specific information, such as measures of balance sheet 
strength, profitability, past securitization business with Fitch, and the sovereign rating in the 
bank’s home country. These bank characteristics are as of year-end 2010 and were publicly 
available several months before the Fitch ratings refinement on July 20, 2011. Theory would 
suggest that they would affect the stock market around this date only if there was then new 
information about their relationship with banks’ strength and performance. To the best of our 
knowledge, such new information could have come only from the ratings refinement itself. This 
refinement could have changed market perceptions of the importance of various bank 
characteristics in Fitch’s assessments of intrinsic financial strength. We do find statistical 
significance for some of these variables, but it changes drastically when we control for the 
concurrent political events in Europe by removing the European banks from the regressions 
sample. This result points to the value of future research that investigates further the channels 





Our study makes four distinct contributions to the literature. First, we study standalone 
ratings that are particularly important for banks but have so far received only marginal attention 
in the academic literature. Second, we study a unique event in which Fitch unequivocally refined 
the information embedded in standalone ratings of banks’ intrinsic financial strength, while 
keeping unchanged its estimates of banks’ default risk. While typical ratings actions are mainly 
directed at bank creditors, this unique setting allows us to examine the importance of credit rating 
information for bank shareholders, who are the residual claimants. 
Third, we test whether the changes in Fitch’s methodology led to ratings inflation. We 
find strong evidence in support of this hypothesis but mixed evidence of ratings catering, with 
potential future business inflating, and past securitization business or analyst proximity deflating 
ratings. Finally, we contribute to the existing literature on the role of credit ratings in addressing 
the opacity of banks. We show that the information in Fitch’s standalone ratings is valuable for 
equity investors. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we provide background 
on bank standalone ratings and Fitch’s change in ratings methodology. In Section II, we outline 
our testable hypotheses. Section III describes our methodology and section IV describes our data. 
Section V presents our empirical results and robustness tests. Section VI concludes. Appendix A 
reports additional results, based on CDS spreads. 
I. Details on the Fitch Refinement 
The first bank standalone ratings were introduced in 1978 by IBCA, which was acquired 
by Fitch in 1997. This history explains the origin of the unusual 9-point rating scale from “A” to 





only using them to infer estimates of sovereign support.7 
Prior to the 2007-2009 crisis bank shareholders may have paid little attention to 
standalone ratings in the belief that intrinsic financial strength was largely inconsequential, as 
governments were bound to keep troubled banks afloat. This belief proved erroneous, with many 
U.S. and European banks nationalized or bailed out with substantial losses to shareholders. Post-
crisis, governments have made public statements indicating reduced official support for banks 
suggesting that equity investors – who could be diluted or wiped out when a bank gets into 
trouble – have an incentive to monitor banks’ intrinsic financial strength. 
In response to criticism and demands from market participants, Fitch Ratings published a 
new set of 21-point standalone ratings for its universe of 861 banks on July 20, 2011. Figure I 
provides a timeline of Fitch actions and describes our setup. Fitch outlined its reasoning in a 
report accompanying the release (Fitch (2011b)), largely reiterating statements made in March 7, 
2011 when the agency first signaled its intention to refine the scale of standalone ratings (Fitch 
(2011a)).8 First, the 21-point standalone ratings provided more granularity on the intrinsic 
financial strength of banks than the existing coarse 9-point scale. Second, the 21-point standalone 
ratings could be compared directly with traditional all-in credit ratings, which are also reported 
on a 21-point scale. Such a comparison reveals the extent to which a bank’s all-in rating 
incorporates the probability of sovereign support. Finally, Fitch added that adopting a similar 
scale and set of symbols as competing rating agencies would benefit market participants while 
highlighting differences in opinions. 
[Insert Figure I here] 
                                                 
7 See Packer and Tarashev (2011), Ueda and Weder di Mauro (2013) and Kroszner (2016) for reviews of post-crisis 
adjustments to both standalone and all-in bank ratings. 
8 See also “Fitch Maintains Approach to Bank Credit Ratings; Evolves Individual Rating Scale Endorsement 





Even though Fitch signaled in March 2011 the transition to the 21-point scale, the exact 
date of the release was not communicated in advance. On July 20, 2011, Fitch published a press 
release, a report, and an Excel spreadsheet with the name, country, region, all-in rating, 9-point 
standalone rating, and 21-point standalone rating for each of the 861 banks in its rating universe. 
The release was timed for 05:00 Eastern Standard Time, when markets were open in Europe but 
prior to the opening of North American markets. This timing ensured that the information was 
communicated as broadly as possible on a single day for all banks in Fitch’s universe. 
II. Testable Hypotheses 
Credit ratings reduce the information asymmetry problem between a firm and its 
stakeholders (Boot et al. (2006)). They reflect both public and private information collected by 
the rating agency, with standard ratings actions signaling a change in the borrower’s financial 
condition. Hand et al. (1992), Ederington and Goh (1998) and Kliger and Sarig (2000) show that 
ratings changes matter for explaining stock and bond returns of non-financial borrowers, with 
Sironi (2003), Cavallo et al. (2013) and Correa et al. (2014) finding similar effects for banks. 
The fact that banks have standalone ratings, whereas most other rated entities do not, is 
consistent with the view that banks are more opaque than non-financial institutions (Morgan 
(2002); Hirtle (2006); Iannotta (2006); Livingston et al. (2007); Bannier et al. (2010); Iannotta 
(2011); Jones et al. (2012)).9 Banks are special in that they are perceived to benefit from implicit 
or explicit sovereign support, even in cases where the government is not a shareholder. As a 
result, creditors wishing to anticipate a credit default need to assess both the intrinsic financial 
strength of the bank and the likelihood and magnitude of extraordinary support it may receive. 
But rating agencies may also provide valuable information to bank shareholders, who stand to 
                                                 
9 While Flannery et al. (2004) initially argued that banking assets were not unusually opaque, Flannery et al. (2013) 





lose the most in a bankruptcy or crisis. Not surprisingly the experience of the 2007-2009 crisis 
led investors to demand more granular ratings information, which motivated Fitch to transition to 
the finer 21-point scale for standalone ratings (Fitch (2011b)). 
Kliger and Sarig (2000) study a comparable event in April 1982 when Moody’s refined 
their all-in credit ratings by attaching numerical modifiers to the coarse rating categories (e.g., A 
=> A1, A2, A3).10 They highlight that credit ratings are categorical, not continuous, with only a 
limited number of categories. A coarse scale forces the rating agency to assign the same rating to 
entities with different estimates of default probability. By refining its scale, the rating agency can 
reveal more of its private information about the relative creditworthiness of different entities. 
Using a sample of 812 U.S. non-financial bonds, Kliger and Sarig (2000) find that the 
announcement of better-than-expected refined ratings is associated with positive abnormal bond 
returns that are larger than the returns of bonds with worse-than-expected refined ratings. As they 
also find a negative relationship between rating surprises and equity values, Kliger and Sarig 
(2000) conclude that the Moody’s refinement revealed private information that was valuable to 
both bondholders and shareholders, leading to a wealth transfer from the latter to the former with 
no overall impact on firm value. 
We build on this research by studying a unique event, in which Fitch revealed information 
about banks’ relative intrinsic financial strength (i.e., the relative likelihood of default in the 
counterfactual absence of sovereign support), but no change to its assessment of relative default 
risk (i.e., the relative likelihood of default in the actual presence of sovereign support). Thus, the 
information revealed in this event was directly relevant for bank shareholders. By contrast, the 
1982 Moody’s refinement studied by Kliger and Sarig (2000) disclosed new information about 
                                                 





assessments of relative default risk. In the case of banks – and absent Moody’s standalone ratings 
– it is impossible to disentangle the intrinsic-strength and external-support components of this 
refinement. 
One challenge in our study is how to interpret the refinements of Fitch’s standalone 
ratings for banks. Existing research proposes two channels for explaining credit ratings inflation 
– one driven by the rated entities and the other driven by the agencies – with empirical support 
for both. The first channel is ratings shopping, which describes the situation where entities solicit 
ratings from multiple agencies and choose to pay for the highest one (Faure-Grimaud et al. 
(2009); Skreta and Veldkamp (2009); Doherty et al. (2012); Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013); Farhi 
et al. (2013)). The second channel is ratings catering, where competition among the rating 
agencies for future business leads to more favorable ratings for borrowers (Mathis et al. (2009); 
Becker and Milbourn (2011); Bolton et al. (2012); Baghai and Becker (2017)).11 Following the 
subprime crisis, a number of researchers have shown that ratings catering was linked in particular 
to the size of the securitization business rated by a particular agency (Griffin and Tang (2012); 
He et al. (2012); Cohen and Manuszak (2013); Griffin et al. (2013); Hau et al. (2013); He et al. 
(2016); Efing and Hau (2015)). There is a conflict of interest when the same agency rates a bank 
as well as the securitization business this bank manages. 
Our study contributes to this literature by examining a setting where ratings catering is a 
concern (as many banks have securitization-related business with Fitch) but there was no 
possibility for ratings shopping (as the refinement we focus on affected existing ratings). In 
particular, Fitch modified the ratings of its entire universe of rated banks at the same time. The 
existing standalone ratings were on a coarse 9-point scale, with overlapping mappings to the 21-
                                                 
11 Competition between agencies can also lead to more ratings coarseness (Goel and Thakor (2015)) which per se 
need not imply ratings inflation. Concerns about agency reputation can make ratings actually less informative 





point scale of all-in ratings as shown in Table I. The coarse standalone rating of “A/B”, for 
example, could map to any long-term rating from “aa+” to “a”. The lower coarse standalone 
rating of “B” could map to a long-term rating from “aa-” to “a-”. Thus, a bank rated lower on the 
coarse scale than a competitor could be more highly rated on the all-in scale. 
[Insert Table I here]  
If the transition from the 9-point to the 21-point scale were random, it would result in 
symmetric distributions of the more granular ratings around their expected levels (we discuss our 
take on expected ratings below). Alternatively, since each 9-point rating maps into a range on the 
21-point scale, there is plenty of scope for the refined ratings to be systematically higher than 
their expected levels. We check formally whether this is the case: 
H1A: The refinement of Fitch’s rating scale resulted in higher than expected standalone 
ratings for banks. 
If we find evidence in support of this hypothesis, we then need to understand what is 
driving any potential ratings inflation. To the extent that refinements change the standalone 
ratings of banks relative to their peers, this relative change could reflect either the agency’s view 
on intrinsic strength or a preferential treatment of client banks. We therefore test whether the 
higher ratings are explained by ratings catering using two proxies: bank size and the amount of 
past securitization business that Fitch received from the given bank. Both measures may indicate 
how much business Fitch may be able to attract in the future. 
H1B: The refinement of Fitch’s rating scale resulted in higher ratings for banks that 
conduct more business with Fitch (ratings catering). 
We next examine how markets react to the greater disclosure of Fitch’s private 
information. Our premise is that shareholders will pay attention to standalone ratings, as they 





intrinsic financial strength should have a lower cost of equity and should thus generate a higher 
present value of cash flows. Ultimately, this should lead to a higher stock price.12 
In addition, changes to relative standalone ratings should also matter. Fitch’s private 
information that Goldman Sachs for example has greater intrinsic financial strength than Bank of 
America may be material information for bank shareholders. In this case, we may observe 
competition effects in the stock reaction, with banks receiving positive news outperforming peers 
receiving negative news (Lang and Stulz (1992); Flannery (1998); Slovin et al. (1999)). Our 
second hypothesis therefore is: 
H2: The stock prices of banks experiencing positive rating surprises will outperform the 
stock prices of banks experiencing negative rating surprises. 
III. Methodology 
We begin with a brief overview of our methodology, with more detail provided below. First, we 
test for evidence of higher than expected ratings by studying the pattern of 21-point standalone 
ratings relative to the 9-point standalone ratings. Second, we create measures of positive and 
negative rating surprises and examine whether these surprises can be explained by bank 
characteristics and whether there is evidence of ratings catering by Fitch. Third, we test if stock 
reactions – as reflected in CARs – can be explained by the magnitude and direction of rating 
surprises. In these tests, we control for bank location, as it could be systematically related to 
market reactions to political announcements that had nothing to do with the refinement of Fitch’s 
standalone ratings (see above). Then, we test whether stock market reactions relate systematically 
to bank characteristics that had been known long before the event we focus on. A systematic 
                                                 
12 Assume bank assets follow a diffusion process as in Leland and Toft (1996), with both a drift and a variance term. 
All else equal, a bank with a higher variance would have a lower standalone rating and a higher value of equity, as 
equity is a call option on the assets. Alternatively, a bank with a smaller drift would also have a lower standalone 





relationship would indicate that Fitch’s announcement led shareholders to revise the weight 
attributed to various characteristics in assessing banks’ intrinsic health. Finally, we check the 
robustness of these results to different measures of rating surprises, event windows, and samples 
of banks. 
Proxies of Investor Expectations for 21-Point Standalone Ratings 
Table I reproduces the Fitch mapping from the 9-point standalone rating to the 21-point 
standalone rating. Given that we cannot observe what shareholders expected when Fitch released 
the granular 21-point standalone ratings, we follow Kliger and Sarig (2000) and create four 
proxies of expected ratings: two based on information available prior to the release (ex ante), and 
two based on information available after the ratings were published (ex post). 
Our first benchmark is based on the midpoint mapping from the 9-point standalone rating 
in column (1) of Table I to the 21-point scale published by Fitch prior to the release of the 
Viability Ratings in column (3) (see Fitch (2010) and Fitch (2011a)). In constructing the first 
benchmark, we assign numerical values to the 21-point standalone ratings in column (3), where 
“aaa” has the highest value of 20, “c” the lowest of 0, and a rating notch has a value of 1. On the 
basis of this, we translate the alphanumeric ratings into numerical ranges in column (4). The 
midpoints of these ranges – in column (5) – become ex ante expected values for our Midpoint 
Map benchmark. One shortcoming of this approach is that five of the nine 9-point standalone 
ratings have midpoints that are not whole numbers, placing them in between actual rating 
categories. For example, the midpoint of the coarse rating “B” is 15.5, placing it between “a+” 
and “a”. We account for this false precision in our tests below. 
The Midpoint Map is not a straightforward benchmark. First, the Fitch mapping in Table I 





coarse standalone ratings of “B/C” and “C” can both be mapped to ”bbb+” or “bbb” on the 21-
point scale. Second, there is variation in the number of possible ratings across categories. One 
coarse rating (“A”) is mapped to three ratings on the 21-point scale. Five coarse ratings (“B”, 
“B/C”, “C”, “C/D”, “E”) are mapped to four ratings on the 21-point scale. The remaining coarse 
ratings (“A/B”, “D”, “D/E”) are mapped to five ratings on the 21-point scale. Third, Fitch 
provided little ex ante guidance on how coarse ratings would be translated to the 21-point scale. It 
was not clear whether the refined ratings would be grouped at the top, the middle, or the bottom 
of the available ranges. Thus the Fitch mapping featured considerable uncertainty. 
Our second benchmark, called Sovereign Support, is based on the Fitch Support Rating 
Floor. The Support Rating Floor (SRF) is a rating on the 21-point scale that reflects the 
probability of extraordinary sovereign support. The March 2011 report, which announced the 21-
point standalone ratings methodology, stated that a bank’s all-in rating is the higher of the 21-
point standalone rating and the SRF, as shown in Figure II. 
[Insert Figure II here] 
While this relationship appears simple, there are a number of complications. First, the 21-
point SRF is based on the Support Rating, expressed on a scale from 1 to 5. A Support Rating of 
1 indicates “an extremely high probability of extraordinary support” while 5 indicates that 
“external support, although possible, cannot be relied on” (Fitch (2011b)). Even though all banks 
have a Support Rating, not all banks are given an explicit SRF. In cases where the SRF is not 
explicit, a Support Rating from 1 to 4 is associated with a minimum SRF. But when the Support 
Rating is 5 – as is the case of one quarter of the banks in our sample – there is no SRF. Second, 
SRF ratings are not widely disseminated. They can be obtained on the Fitch website by looking 





in the Excel spreadsheet containing the new 21-point standalone ratings, nor are they readily 
available on Bloomberg, Datastream, Bankscope, Compustat or Capital IQ. Third, there are 
differences between bank holding companies and operating companies. For example, the bank 
holding company JPMorgan Chase & Co. has a Support Rating of 5 and no SRF, while the U.S. 
operating company JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. has a Support Rating of 1 and an SRF of “A+”. 
Fourth, the hierarchy shown in Figure II is not respected for a small number of banks that have 
both a local currency and a foreign-currency all-in rating (at a notch below). In these cases, the 
21-point standalone rating can be higher than the foreign-currency all-in rating. Similar to the 9-
to-21-point mapping, it is uncertain if shareholders knew these features of the Fitch sovereign 
support framework. 
Nonetheless, our Sovereign Support benchmark assumes market participants understood 
the SRF framework and could predict a subset of 21-point standalone ratings using the 
relationship in Figure II. In cases where the all-in rating is higher than the SRF, the 21-point 
standalone rating must be the same as the all-in rating. But when the all-in rating equals the SRF, 
the exact 21-point standalone rating is unknown. It could be the same as the SRF or lower, with 
the range potentially restricted by the 9-to-21-point mapping in Table I. Formally, the Sovereign 
Support benchmark is: 
If all-in rating > Support Rating Floor, then 21-point standalone rating = all-in 
rating 
(1) 
If all-in Rating = Support Rating Floor, then 21-point standalone rating = min(all-in 
rating, midpoint of the Fitch 9-to-21-point mapping) 
(2) 
Two examples illustrate this calculation. Nordea Bank AB of Sweden had an all-in rating of 





the standalone rating, the 21-point standalone rating must be “aa-” (17.0). Raiffeisen Bank of 
Austria had an all-in rating of “A” (15.0) and an SRF of “A” (15.0). Given that the all-in rating is 
equal to the SRF, the 21-point standalone rating is unknown, although it can be expected to be in 
the range of “bb+” (10.0) to “bbb” (13.0) based on its coarse standalone rating of “C” (recall 
Table I). The expected 21-point standalone rating is therefore the minimum of (15.0, 13.0), 
implying an expected standalone rating of “bbb”. 
Given the uncertainty with the above two ex-ante benchmarks, we also create two ex post 
benchmarks based on the actual 21-point standalone ratings released on July 20, 2011. The first 
of these ex post benchmarks is shown in column (6) of Table I. The Mean of 21-Point Standalone 
Ratings is calculated as the mean 21-point standalone rating across the banks in each of the 
categories on the 9-point scale.13 To avoid any selection bias, we calculate the averages using 
Fitch’s entire universe of 861 banks, while most of our analysis considers only a subsample of 
this universe (see below). Table I shows, for instance, that the average bank with a 9-point 
standalone rating of “A/B” received a 21-point standalone rating score of 17.4. 
We also compare a bank’s ranking based on the 9-point standalone ratings (available ex 
ante) with the same bank’s ranking based on the 21-point standalone ratings (available ex post). 
The Fitch definition of 9-point standalone rating indicates that a bank rated “B/C” (13.5) has a 
higher intrinsic financial strength than a bank rated “C” (11.5). But, in a reversal of this ranking, 
some banks rated “C” received higher 21-point standalone ratings than banks rated “B/C”. If 
standalone rankings reverse order, there may be a reversal in banks’ perceived intrinsic strength, 
leading to a stock price reaction. 
Our second ex post benchmark – called Ordinal Ranking – accounts for ranking reversals 
                                                 
13 We verify that all the subsequent tests using the mean of the 21-point standalone rating are robust when using the 





in the transition from 9-point to 21-pount standalone ratings. In constructing this benchmark, we 
focus on one bank, A, and identify any other banks, B, vis-à-vis which it experiences a ranking 
reversal.14 When such banks exist, we calculate the benchmark as the 9-point standalone rating of 
A minus the average 9-point standalone rating of banks B. When banks B do not exist, we set the 
Ordinal Ranking benchmark to zero. 
Despite being calculated ex post, these two benchmarks are still informative for our study. 
They are simple to calculate, and are widely and immediately available, thus potentially affecting 
the market’s reaction to Fitch’s 21-point standalone ratings release on July 20, 2011. In addition, 
the ex post mean benchmark embeds the assumption that shareholders did not make systematic 
errors in forming their expectations. 
Measures of Rating Surprises 
We create four proxies of rating surprises based on our benchmarks. The first three proxies take 
the same form, with a surprise equal to the actual minus the expected rating. The fourth proxy 
zooms in on cases of ranking reversals and measures by how many rating notches these reversals 
benefit or harm individual banks. Specifically, we calculate the following: 
Rating Surprise for Midpoint Map= 21-Point Standalone Rating – Midpoint Map (3)
Rating Surprise for Sovereign Support= 21-Point Standalone Rating – Sovereign 
Support 
(4)
Rating Surprise for Mean of 21-Point Standalone = 21-Point Standalone Rating – Mean 
of 21-Point Standalone Ratings 
(5)
                                                 
14 If a bank A in our sample experiences a positive (negative) ranking reversal vis-à-vis one or more other banks, B, 





Rating Surprise for Ordinal Ranking = (21-Point Standalone for Bank A – mean 21-
Point Standalone for Banks B) – (9-Point Standalone for Bank A – mean 9-Point 
Standalone for Banks B), 
(6)
where banks B are those vis-à-vis which bank A experiences a ranking reversal. The measure is 
zero if the set of banks B is empty. 
Measures of Abnormal Stock Returns 
We study the stock reaction to the announcement of 21-point standalone ratings using abnormal 
returns relative to three benchmarks, similar to Kliger and Sarig (2000). Our first measure is a 
market model-adjusted return. For it, we regress daily bank stock returns on the returns from a 
country-specific stock market index, the returns on the MSCI World Bank index, and a 
constant.15 The MSCI World Bank index controls for factors that may be affecting this industry 
but are not captured by the country-specific stock market index. We estimate these regressions 
over an estimation window from 80 to 10 trading days prior to the announcement day. We use the 
coefficients from these regressions to predict the stock returns over the event window. The 
market model-adjusted abnormal return is the actual return minus the predicted return. 
Our second measure is the mean-adjusted abnormal returns. It is equal to a bank’s actual 
stock return minus the average daily stock return for that bank over an estimation window from 
80 to 10 trading days prior to the announcement. 
Our third benchmark is the size-adjusted abnormal returns. The size-adjusted abnormal 
return is the actual stock return for a given bank minus the contemporaneous return of the equal-
size decile portfolio of banks. This equal-size decile portfolio is based on the banks in the sample, 
                                                 
15 In an earlier version of the paper, we used the returns from an equal-weighted portfolio of 467 banks not rated by 





where deciles are created based on total assets at year-end 2010, converted to U.S. dollars at year-
end 2010 exchange rates. 
We calculate CARs at the bank level for three different windows around the event: the 
two days from July 20 to 21, 2011 [0,1], the one week from July 20 to 24, 2011 [0,4] and the five 
days around the Fitch release, from July 18 to 22, 2011 [-2,2]. 
Impact of Greek Bail-Out Negotiations 
One of many European summits concerning the Greek sovereign debt crisis took place on July 
21, 2011 – the day following the Fitch announcement. At this summit, EU leaders debated a 
European Commission proposal for a tax on Eurozone banks to fund the repurchase of Greek 
sovereign debt. Given Germany’s opposition, this levy was rejected, with the news made public 
on the day after Fitch’s announcement. This news was potentially positive for banks exposed to 
Greece as well as (through a contagion channel, for example) banks exposed to Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain (collectively the “GIIPS”). International Banking Statistics available in July 
2011 reveal that effectively only European banks had material exposure to GIIPS sovereigns. We 
find that the news from the EU Summit was associated with a positive stock reaction for 
Eurozone banks and no consistent pattern of stock reactions across non-Eurozone banks (see 
Appendix B), thus possibly contaminating the stock market reaction to Fitch’s rating refinement. 
We address this concern in three ways. First, our measure of abnormal returns controls for 
movements in the national stock market, as well as the change in the MSCI World Bank index. 
Second, we include as controls a dummy variable set to 1 for banks from Italy, Portugal and 
Spain (there are no Greek or Irish banks in our sample), and a second dummy set to 1 for other 
European banks. These dummy variables may pick up the average effect due to the news from the 






When the refined standalone ratings were released, Fitch published an Excel spreadsheet 
containing the 21-point standalone ratings for its universe of 861 rated banks. The spreadsheet 
also contained the 9-point standalone ratings and the all-in ratings, but not the Support Ratings or 
the Support Rating Floors. We identify 279 publicly-listed banks where both stock return data 
from Datastream and financial statement data from Bankscope are available. We drop 18 banks 
that had no coarse standalone rating or all-in rating prior to the release of the 21-point standalone 
ratings, as we cannot calculate ratings surprises for these banks.16 We drop another 28 banks that 
are majority-owned by a government or other investor, as Fitch assigns the standalone rating in 
these cases based on the rating of the majority owner. For example, the ratings of Turkey’s 
Alternatifbank reflect the support from its majority shareholder, the Anadolu Group, which Fitch 
describes as a leading Turkish conglomerate. Finally, we drop the five Greek banks in our 
sample, as they were caught up with the difficulties facing the Greek sovereign in 2011. All five 
were downgraded on July 14, 2011, shortly before the release of the 21-point standalone ratings, 
and then downgraded again on July 26, 2011, days after the release. We hand collected data on 
the Support Rating and the Support Rating Floor from the Fitch website.17 We also hand 
collected data on all Fitch ratings as of March 2011, prior to the announcement of the plan to 
introduce 21-point standalone ratings. 
Table II shows the final sample of 212 banks across 39 countries. The sample features a 
roughly even distribution across regions, with North American banks representing 29% of the 
sample, Asian banks 25%, European banks 25%, and banks from the rest of the world 21%. 
[Insert Table II here] 
                                                 
16 Both the 9- and 21-point standalone ratings of 11 Chinese banks were first published on July 20, 2011. 





We proxy for potential conflicts of interest between Fitch and individual banks using data 
on securitization activity from Hau et al. (2013) and Efing and Hau (2015). This data is based on 
the credit ratings of more than 6,500 mortgage- and asset-backed securities published by Fitch, 
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s between 1999 and 2011. For each bank we create a variable, 
Fitch Securitization Share, capturing the volume of the bank’s securitization business rated by 
Fitch over 2000 to 2010 as a percentage of the bank’s total securitization business over this 
decade. Banks with no securitization business or no business with Fitch are assigned 0%. The 
ratings catering hypothesis would predict Fitch will assign a higher standalone rating if it has 
rated a greater share of a bank’s past securitization business, all else equal.18 But an alternative 
explanation is that Fitch may face less uncertainty about these banks’ business and franchise 
value, which could lead it to assign a higher standalone rating, all else equal. We are therefore 
cautious when interpreting this variable as we cannot distinguish between these two explanations. 
Given the literature on the importance of geographic proximity for mitigating information 
asymmetry through informal networks (e.g., Butler (2008), Agarwal and Hauswald (2010)), we 
construct a variable to identify banks where the Fitch analyst is located in the same city as the 
bank’s headquarters. We download the Fitch press release for each bank prior to July 21, 2011, 
which names the Fitch analyst(s) responsible for the bank and provides their contact information. 
We set the dummy variable Local Analyst to 1 if the analyst is in the same city as the bank’s 
headquarters (or within a two hour drive), and 0 otherwise. Our expectation is that analysts who 
are closer to the bank’s head offices may provide higher standalone ratings due to greater 
familiarity or stronger ratings catering. 
Table III provides descriptive statistics for the Fitch ratings used in this analysis, the four 
                                                 
18 In an earlier draft, we use the natural logarithm of all securitization business for a bank whether rated by Fitch, 





benchmarks of rating surprises, seven bank-specific characteristics, and CARs over three time 
windows. Fitch ratings are translated into a numerical value, where the highest value corresponds 
to the highest rating category (as shown in Appendix C). The average bank in our sample has a 
21-point standalone rating of “bbb+”, corresponding to a value of 13.0, statistically higher than 
the average 9-point standalone rating of 12.3 (p-value 0.001). The average Support Rating Floor 
is lower at 9.9, slightly below “bb+”, implying the average standalone rating is 3.1 ratings 
notches above this floor.19 Our sample includes 49 banks with a Support Rating of “5” and a 
Support Rating Floor of “no floor”, indicating support cannot be relied upon. For the four 
measures of ratings surprises a value of 1.0 represents one notch on the 21-point scale. For 
example, a bank receiving a “bbb+” rating when the expectation was for a “bbb” would have a 
positive surprise of 1.0. Appendix D reports correlations between all measures. 
[Insert Table III here] 
With stability in mind, we calculate bank-specific characteristics as the time averages 
between 2008 and 2010 of variables motivated by existing studies and by Fitch (Fitch (2011a)). 
We proxy for size using the natural logarithm of total assets, Ln(Assets), converted to millions of 
U.S. dollars at year-end exchange rates. Fitch Securitization Share is the sum of Fitch-rated 
securitizations as a percentage of all securitization business originated by a given bank from 2000 
to 2010. We measure leverage as Common Equity/Total Assets, using common equity at book 
value. Fitch identifies profitability, liquidity and funding as key drivers of ratings (Fitch (2011a)). 
Profitability is measured using Return on Equity (ROE), which is net income divided by average 
shareholders’ equity. Our proxy for liquidity risk, Liquidity Ratio, is cash and marketable 
securities divided by the sum of customer deposits and short and long-term debt. Our proxy for 
                                                 
19 Two Brazilian, one Kuwaiti, three Thai and three Turkish banks have all-in ratings above their sovereign rating. 





funding risk, Short-term Funding, is based on Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), who use the 
share of short-term funding (interbank borrowing plus short-term debt) as a percentage of total 
funding (interbank borrowing, short-term debt and long-term debt). The local analyst dummy is 
set to 1 if the Fitch analysts are located in the same city as the bank’s headquarters or within a 
two-hour drive, and 0 otherwise. CARs are calculated using three methods: market model-
adjusted, mean-adjusted, and size-adjusted. We sum the CARs over different windows to check 
for robustness. Within each CAR measure, Appendix E shows that series based on different 
windows are pairwise correlated from 33% to 87%. 
V. Results 
Testing Higher than Expected Standalone Ratings (H1A) 
We begin by considering all banks in Fitch’s rating universe to examine whether the refinement 
of the agency’s rating scale led to higher than expected standalone ratings. We test this first 
hypothesis in several ways. First, we test whether the mean (or median) value of the 21-point 
standalone ratings is statistically different from the midpoint in the mapping provided by Fitch. 
Table I (column (6)) shows the results of a parametric test for the universe of 861 banks rated by 
Fitch. The mean of 21-point standalone ratings is higher and statistically different than the 
midpoint of the range for each of the 9-point categories. For the full sample, the 21-point 
standalone ratings appear to be higher by around half a rating notch, as seen in the final row of 
the table (10.8 vs. 10.4). 
Second, we visually inspect the outcomes for the 212 banks in our sample. Table IV 
shows the matrix of 9-point standalone ratings in the columns vs. the 21-point standalone ratings 
in the rows. The shaded boxes represent the ranges (or buckets) communicated by Fitch in their 





number of banks with the corresponding 9-point and 21-point ratings, with a total of 212 banks. 
We note that the majority of observations are in the top half of each bucket, with five banks 
receiving 21-point standalone ratings above the buckets. This pattern is consistent with ratings 
inflation for our sample banks, but it is not conclusive. We therefore test the probability of 
observing this distribution using Monte Carlo simulations with random allocation within each 
bucket based on the Rating Surprise for Midpoint Map. This test rejects the null hypothesis that 
this distribution is random, leading us to conclude the pattern is not the result of chance and is 
supportive of ratings inflation (H1A).20 
[Insert Table IV here] 
 We note many examples in which the transition from the 9-point to the 21-point scale 
triggered a reversal in the ordinal ranking of standalone ratings. For example, there are 18 banks 
rated “C” (11.5) on the 9-point scale that ended up with higher ratings on the 21-point scale than 
8 banks rated “B/C” (13.5) on the 9-point scale. Overall, 75 of the 212 banks in the sample 
experienced a rating reversal. We examine such cases in greater detail below. 
Explaining Rating Surprises 
Next we examine the drivers of rating surprises. Figure III provides histograms for the 
four surprise proxies, based on different benchmarks. The distribution of rating surprises based 
on the Midpoint Map benchmark is positively skewed, with a large number of banks receiving 
21-point standalone ratings that are more than one notch higher than expected. The Sovereign 
Support benchmark provides a different picture, as the majority of 21-point standalone ratings 
could be predicted from the corresponding all-in rating and Support Rating Floor. Surprises based 
                                                 
20 We rerun our entire analysis so far, and what follows, for March 7, 2011, the date when Fitch signaled its 
intention to modify the ratings scale for bank standalone ratings. Results are qualitatively quite similar, though 
statistically less significant and quantitatively smaller, suggesting most information pertinent to investors concerning 





on the Mean of 21-Point Standalone Ratings benchmark have a roughly symmetric distribution 
by construction, with slightly more positive than negative surprises. The distribution of surprises 
based on the Ordinal Ranking benchmark has large positive and negative tails. 
[Insert Figure III here] 
Table V reports the distribution of rating surprises across positive (higher than expected), 
neutral (as expected) and negative (lower than expected) outcomes. The Rating Surprise for 
Midpoint Map generates 43% positive surprises and only 6% negative surprises. We treat any 
surprises within half a notch as neutral, as they are artificially generated when the midpoint of the 
relevant range is not a whole number. Using the Rating Surprise for Sovereign Support 
benchmark, bank Viability Ratings are easily predictable for 82% of the banks, whose all-in 
ratings are greater than the corresponding Support Rating Floors. With only 3 banks or 1% of the 
sample showing a positive surprise, we anticipate finding no statistical significance in response to 
positive surprises for this proxy. Again, rating surprises based on the Mean of the 21-Point 
Standalone are more balanced by construction, with 39% positive surprises and 26% negative. 
Finally the Ordinal Ranking benchmark generates 20% positive surprises and 15% negative 
surprises, with roughly two-thirds of the banks maintaining their ordinal ranking. 
 [Insert Table V here] 
Testing Ratings Catering (H1B) 
We test whether rating surprises can be explained by ratings catering. Table VI provides 
regression results for the sample of 212 banks. We run three specifications for each benchmark. 
The first two specifications test bank size and the Fitch securitization share separately. These 
variables are pairwise correlated at 45% (40% when excluding the 53 European banks). This 





activity.21 The third specification includes bank-specific control variables. We include region 
dummies, with North American (US and Canadian) banks as the base case, as well as dummies 
for the top three and bottom three categories of the 9-point standalone ratings. The regressions 
are estimated with robust standard errors with clustering by country. 
[Insert Table VI here] 
The regressions explain from 22% to 34% of the variation in rating surprises, with the 
adjusted R-squared noticeably lower for the Sovereign Support benchmark as expected. Rating 
surprises are positively associated with sovereign rating, liquidity, and the region dummies 
(outside North America, which is the base case). Interestingly the local analyst dummy is always 
negative but only statistically different from zero in half the cases, suggesting that banks with a 
local analyst receive smaller positive or larger negative surprises than the average bank. The 
positive association between rating surprises and bank size is particularly robust. When used 
alone, the Fitch securitization share has a positive but not statistically significant coefficient in 
three out of the four specifications. Combined with bank size, the securitization share produces a 
statistically significant negative coefficient in two out of the four specifications. These results 
provide mixed evidence for the hypothesis of ratings catering (H1B), as they suggest that bank 
size (as in e.g., Baghai and Becker (2017)), but not necessarily past securitization business with 
Fitch, plays a role.22 
Univariate Tests of Rating Surprises and Stock Returns (H2) 
Next we test the hypothesis that the stock prices of banks experiencing higher rating surprises 
                                                 
21 Tobit regressions of Fitch securitization share on dummies for bank size quintiles generate monotonically 
increasing coefficients that are statistically significant for the upper three quintiles of bank size (i.e., largest 60% by 
assets), but generate a pseudo-R2 of only 23%. 
22 We do find a positive correlation between the Directional Ordinal Rating Quality Shortfall (DORQS) proposed by 
Hau et al. (2013) as a measure of the extant rating bias and the past securitization business with Fitch. This could 





outperform banks experiencing lower rating surprises. We report univariate tests before 
presenting multivariate regressions. 
In Table VII we compare the equally-weighted stock return for portfolios of banks that 
received positive rating surprises with that for portfolios of banks with negative surprises. We 
show results for the CARs summed from two days before to two days after the Fitch release. 
Results using the other event windows are qualitatively similar and available upon request. We 
provide results using three measures of CARs: market model-adjusted, mean-adjusted and size-
adjusted. Panel A reports results for the full sample, and Panel B for the sample excluding 
European banks. Overall, the magnitude of stock reactions is greatest when using the mean-
adjusted CARs and smallest for the size-adjusted CARs. The difference between positive vs. 
negative rating surprises is statistically significant in 18 out of 24 cases, ranging from 1.2% to 
5.9%. The largest differences are for the Sovereign Support benchmark, likely due to the small 
number of surprises (36 out of 212 banks for the full sample, 29 out of 159 non-European banks). 
[Insert Table VII here] 
In Panel A, the difference between the CARs for banks experiencing positive surprises 
and those for banks experiencing negative surprises is positive and statistically significant in ten 
out of twelve cases. Concretely, the CAR outperformance ranges from 1.2% to 4.6% using 
market model-adjusted CARs, 2.3% to 5.9% using mean-adjusted CARs, and 1.4% to 3.8% using 
size-adjusted CARs. Across the twelve cases, the average outperformance is 2.9%. The results 
excluding European banks in Panel B are similar but the CARs are smaller in magnitude. The 
banks experiencing positive surprises outperform banks with negative surprises in seven out of 
twelve cases. For the eight cases that are statistically different from zero, the average 





Multivariate Tests of Rating Surprises and Stock Returns (H2) 
Next we perform regression analysis of stock-market reactions to positive and negative surprises. 
Table VIII presents cross-sectional regressions using a dummy variable for positive and negative 
rating surprises (with no surprise as the base case), with robust standard errors clustered by 
country. Panel A presents results for all banks and Panel B excludes European banks. The 
specifications in columns (1), (4), (7) and (10) only use the ratings surprise dummies and 
generate coefficients that have the same magnitude and statistical significance as the univariate 
tests in Table VII. The reference case with no rating surprises is captured by the constant, and is 
never statistically different from zero. At the bottom of each column we calculate the difference 
between the coefficients on the positive and negative dummies, and test whether this difference is 
statistically different from zero. Consistent with Table VI, this test in Panel A confirms that banks 
receiving positive surprises outperform banks with negative surprises by 1.2% to 4.6%, and in 
Panel B excluding European banks by 1.3% to 3.8%. 
[Insert Table VIII here] 
Columns (2), (5), (8) and (11) add regional dummies for banks in Asia, 
Italy/Portugal/Spain, Europe less Italy/Portugal/Spain, and the rest of world. These variables 
capture stock market reactions related to Greece or other regional announcements unrelated to the 
Fitch release. Using the full sample of banks in Panel A, the positive coefficients for European 
countries suggest an average CAR of 1.28% to 2.48% over this five-day window. The inclusion 
of regional dummies changes little the magnitudes of the rating surprise coefficients, with the 
differences between positive and negatives surprises ranging from 1.2% to 4.6% and remaining 
statistically significant in three out of four cases. When we exclude European banks (Panel B), 





ranges from 1.2% to 4.2%. We thus conclude that the effect of Fitch’s ratings refinement on the 
stock market is robust to controlling for possible regional announcements. 
To dig deeper into these results, we add the bank-specific characteristics in columns (3), 
(6), (9) and (12). These characteristics were publicly available long before the release of the 21-
point standalone ratings. That said, the rating refinement may have revealed new information 
about the weights that Fitch assigns to different bank characteristics in assessing intrinsic 
financial strength. And this new information could drive stock-market responses. 
Indeed, adding bank characteristics increases the fit of the regressions to 10% to 12% for 
the full sample (Panel A) and to 8% to 12% for the sample excluding European banks (Panel B). 
In Panel A, CARs are positively associated with sovereign ratings and ROEs, and negatively 
associated with the Fitch analyst dummy. In Panel B, CARs are positively associated with short-
term funding, and negatively associated with the Fitch analyst dummy. Overall, the presence of a 
local Fitch analyst reduces five-day CARs by 0.81% to 1.5%. 
Including bank-specific characteristics as explanatory variables results in generally lower 
magnitudes and statistical significance of the coefficients of rating surprise dummies. For the 
Midpoint Map and Mean benchmarks, the impact of standalone ratings refinement on bank stock 
prices can be fully explained by new information about the weights that Fitch assigns to specific 
bank characteristics in assessing intrinsic financial strength. That said, the Sovereign Support 
results in column (6) and, to a lesser extent the Ordinal Ranking results in column (12), tell a 
different story. For these benchmarks, we still obtain a positive difference between CARs for 
positive and negative rating surprises. In three out of the four cases, these differences are 
statistically significant and imply a five-day outperformance of 1.0% to 3.3%. 





measures of ratings surprises instead of dummy variables. We include a squared term for rating 
surprises to capture non-linear dependencies. This term is only statistically significant for the 
Sovereign Support benchmark with the fewest number of surprises, consistent with a concave 
relationship between rating surprises and stock market reaction. The remaining results are very 
similar to Table VIII. In particular, we find that the coefficient on rating surprises has the 
expected positive sign and is statistically significant when using the midpoint map, mean of the 
21-point standalone rating and ordinal ranking benchmarks. The results are robust to controlling 
for regional dummies. Again, the direction of the stock market reaction can be explained to a 
large extent by new information about the weights that Fitch assigns to different bank 
characteristics in assessing financial strength. 
 [Insert Table IX here] 
VI. Conclusion 
Standalone ratings have unique importance for the banking sector as they provide an 
assessment of banks’ intrinsic financial strength without taking into account the extraordinary 
support from the home country sovereign (or a parent company in the case of subsidiaries). 
Standalone ratings have not been studied before in the academic literature but warrant greater 
attention due to the information they convey for bank shareholders and policymakers. 
In July 2011, Fitch Ratings released standalone ratings on a 21-point scale for their 
universe of rated banks, replacing the existing 9-point scale. The new, refined standalone ratings 
are directly comparable with Fitch’s all-in ratings – the widely publicized measure of default risk 
that incorporates potential sovereign support. This event clarified Fitch’s assessment of banks’ 
intrinsic financial strength. It also clarified the degree of extraordinary sovereign support that 





In essence, Fitch publicly disclosed private information that was particularly relevant for equity 
investors, while maintaining the same assessment of bank default risk. 
Using this uniquely informative event, we study the drivers of standalone rating 
refinements and examine evidence whether the rating agency`s private information is valuable for 
bank shareholders. We find evidence that the transition to a more granular rating scale tended to 
deliver higher than expected bank standalone ratings, with mixed evidence of ratings catering. A 
robust result is that larger banks tended to receive positive rating surprises. To a lesser extent, the 
same was true for banks that were more liquid and located in countries with a higher sovereign 
rating and outside North America. Equity investors responded positively to the publication of 
higher-than-expected ratings. We find that much of this equity investor response is due to greater 
clarity about the importance Fitch attributed to different bank characteristics when assigning 
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Figure I: Timeline of the Change in Fitch’s Bank Standalone Ratings
This figure provides a comprehensive timeline of Fitch actions and reports and of our study setup.
Estimation Window to Assess Normal Stock 
Returns
Bank Controls, Averaged 2008-2010
Figure II: Fitch’s Bank Rating Methodology
This figure sets out the high-level framework communicated by Fitch, showing that the all-in rating (“Issuer Default Rating”) is the higher of the 21-point
standalone rating (“Viability Rating”) or the Sovereign Support Rating (“Support Rating Floor”). Standalone ratings measure a bank's intrinsic financial
strength, defined as a capacity to maintain ongoing operations and to avoid failure. The 21-point standalone rating excludes any extraordinary support that
may be derived from outside of the entity, as well as any potential benefits to a bank's financial position from other extraordinary measures, including a
distressed restructuring of liabilities. A bank’s Support Rating Floor is derived directly from its support rating and defines the minimum long-term Issuer
Default Rating that would be assigned to that bank. The likelihood of support being forthcoming is expressed in relative rank order on a rating scale of ‘1’
(“extremely high probability”) to ‘5’ (“cannot be relied on”). Source: Fitch Ratings (2011a), p.2.
This figure provides histograms of rating surprises under four different benchmarks for the sample of 212 banks. Rating notches are shown on
the horizontal axis and the number of banks in each bin on the vertical axis. The measures of rating surprises are based on four benchmarks:
(i) the Midpoint Map, based on the Fitch mapping of standalone ratings from the 9-point to the 21-point scale; (ii) the Sovereign Support,
based on the relationship between the all-in rating, the 21-point standalone rating, and the Sovereign Support rating; (iii) the Mean of 21-Point
Standalone Rating benchmark based on a comparison of actual 21-point standalone ratings assigned to banks within each coarse rating
category; and (iv) the Ordinal Ranking based on a comparison of the rank ordering of banks under the 21-point standalone rating vs. the rank
ordering under the 9-point standalone rating. The first three rating surprise measures are the actual 21-point standalone rating minus the
benchmark (expected) rating; the fourth rating surprise measure shows the degree of ranking reversals.
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0 aa to aaa 18 – 20 19.0
19 a to aa+ 15 – 19 17.0 17.4 **
[.0305]
90 a- to aa- 14 – 17 15.5 16.0 ***
[.0001]
169 bbb to a 12 – 15 13.5 13.9 ***
[.0001]
190 bb+ to bbb+ 10 – 13 11.5 12.1 ***
[.0001]
140 bb- to bbb- 8 – 11 9.5 9.9 ***
[.0001]
132 b- to bb 5 – 9 7.0 7.4 ***
[.0001]
86 ccc to b+ 3 – 7 5.0 5.5 ***
[.0001]
35 c to ccc 0 – 3 1.5 2.5 ***
[.0001]
861 c to aaa 0 – 20 10.4 10.8 ***
[.0001]
Table I: Fitch Transition From 9- to 21-Point Standalone Ratings for 861 Banks
This table provides details on Fitch's transition from 9-point standalone ratings ("Individual Ratings") to 21-point standalone
ratings ("Viability Ratings"). The underlying sample comprises all 861 banks in Fitch's entire rating universe. Column (1) reports
Fitch's labels for the 9-point standalone rating. Column (2) provides the number of banks with a given 9-point standalone rating.
For each 9-point standalone rating, the corresponding range on the 21-point scale is provided in letters in column (3) and
numbers in column (4). Column (5) shows the (ex ante) midpoint mapping for each of the 9-point ratings. Column (6) shows the
(ex post) mean of the corresponding values on the 21-point scale. The stars represent the statistical significance for a parametric
test of the difference in means between Columns (5) and (6). ***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and











Country North America Asia Europe Rest of World
Total Number of 
Banks
Percent of Sample
AUSTRALIA 7 7 3.3
AUSTRIA 2 2 0.9
BELGIUM 2 2 0.9
BRAZIL 3 3 1.4
CANADA 6 6 2.8
CHILE 3 3 1.4
CYPRUS 1 1 0.5
DENMARK 1 1 0.5
FINLAND 1 1 0.5
FRANCE 3 3 1.4
GERMANY 5 5 2.4
HONG KONG 2 2 0.9
INDIA 7 7 3.3
INDONESIA 5 5 2.4
ISRAEL 2 2 0.9
ITALY 10 10 4.7
JAPAN 9 9 4.2
KOREA (SOUTH) 4 4 1.9
KUWAIT 5 5 2.4
MALAYSIA 3 3 1.4
MEXICO 1 1 0.5
NETHERLANDS 1 1 0.5
NORWAY 5 5 2.4
POLAND 1 1 0.5
PORTUGAL 3 3 1.4
QATAR 3 3 1.4
RUSSIA 4 4 1.9
SAUDI ARABIA 6 6 2.8
SINGAPORE 3 3 1.4
SOUTH AFRICA 4 4 1.9
SPAIN 6 6 2.8
SWEDEN 4 4 1.9
SWITZERLAND 3 3 1.4
TAIWAN 7 7 3.3
THAILAND 6 6 2.8
TURKEY 7 7 3.3
UAE 7 7 3.3
UK 5 5 2.4
USA 55 55 25.9
     Total Number of Banks 61 53 53 45 212 100.0
Percent of Sample 28.8 25.0 25.0 21.2 100.0
Table II: Overview of Sample
This table provides details on the 212 banks from 40 countries in the stock market sample. North American banks represent 29% of the sample,
Asian banks 25%, European banks 25%, and banks from the rest of the world 21%.
Variable Names Variable Definitions Point or Units Mean Minimum Median Maximum
Fitch Ratings ("Fitch Names")
9-Point Standalone Rating "Individual Rating", E to A, mapped into the 21-Point by midpoint Notches 12.3 1.5 13.5 17.0
21-Point Standalone Rating "Viability Rating", c to aaa Notches 13.0 3.0 13.0 18.0
All-in Rating "Issuer Default Rating", C to AAA Notches 13.8 3.0 14.0 18.0
Support Rating Floor "Support Rating Floor", C to AAA Notches 9.9 0.0 11.0 17.0
Sovereign Rating Rating of the sovereign nation where the bank is located Notches 17.3 10.0 19.0 20.0
Rating Surprises
Rating Surprise for Midpoint Map = 21-Point Standalone Rating – Midpoint Map Notches 0.6 -1.5 0.0 3.5
Rating Surprise for Sovereign Support = 21-Point Standalone Rating – Min{All-in Rating, 9-Point Standalone Rating Midpoint} Notches 0.2 -1.0 0.0 2.5
Rating Surprise for Mean = Actual 21-point standalone  – Mean of 21-point standalone rating Notches 0.0 -2.2 -0.2 2.8
Rating Surprise for Ordinal Ranking = (21-Point Standalone for Bank A – mean 21-Point Standalone for Banks B)  –  
(9-Point Standalone for Bank A – mean 9-Point Standalone for Banks B) 
Notches 0.2 -3.3 0.0 3.8
Bank Characteristics
Bank Size  Natural logarithm of total assets US$ millions 11.3 6.8 11.1 14.8
Fitch Securitization Share All securitization business originated by a given bank and rated by Fitch as a percentage 
of all securitization business by the bank over the period 2000 to 2010
Per cent 15.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Common Equity / Total Assets Common equity divided by total assets Per cent 8.0% 1.6% 7.4% 20.2%
Return on Equity Net income divided by average shareholders’ equity Per cent 7.5% -39.6% 8.3% 26.9%
Liquidity Ratio Cash and marketable securities divided by customer deposits plus short and long-term deb Per cent 17.8% 0.0% 14.4% 73.5%
Short-term Funding Interbank borrowing plus short-term debt divided by interbank borrowing plus 
short-term debt and long-term debt
Per cent 18.1% 0.1% 14.6% 61.4%
Local Analyst Dummy A dummy set to 1 if the Fitch analyst covering the bank is located in the same city 
as the bank's headquarters (or within a two hour drive), or 0 otherwise
Dummy 0,1 0.43 0.00 0.00 1.00
Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Market Model-adjusted
[0,1] Cumulative abnormal return from July 20 to July 21, 2011 Per cent 0.8% -8.0% 0.6% 8.9%
[0,4] Cumulative abnormal return from July 20 to July 25, 2011 Per cent 0.1% -14.2% 0.0% 9.5%
[-2,2] Cumulative abnormal return from July 18 to July 22, 2011 Per cent 0.2% -11.7% 0.0% 12.0%
Mean-adjusted
[0,1] Cumulative abnormal return from July 20 to July 21, 2011 Per cent 3.1% -6.4% 2.1% 15.8%
[0,4] Cumulative abnormal return from July 20 to July 25, 2011 Per cent 2.1% -13.2% 1.7% 12.6%
[-2,2] Cumulative abnormal return from July 18 to July 22, 2011 Per cent 2.6% -10.2% 2.1% 17.3%
Size-adjusted
[0,1] Cumulative abnormal return from July 20 to July 21, 2011 Per cent 0.0% -7.8% -0.7% 12.0%
[0,4] Cumulative abnormal return from July 20 to July 25, 2011 Per cent 0.0% -14.0% 0.0% 11.8%
[-2,2] Cumulative abnormal return from July 18 to July 22, 2011 Per cent 0.0% -10.7% -0.1% 10.6%
This table reports the names, definitions and descriptive statistics for the variables in our analysis. These statistics are based for the 212 banks. Fitch ratings are translated into a numerical value according to the table in
Appendix I, where a higher value corresponds to higher rating category. The bank characteristics (except Fitch Securitization Share and the Local Analyst Dummy) are averages from 2008 to 2010 and are from
Bankscope. Rating Surprise for Ordinal Ranking is calculated as stated below if bank A experiences a ranking reversal vis-a-vis some banks B; and zero otherwise.
Table III: Descriptive Statistics
9-Point Standalone Rating








aa 18 5 1 6
aa- 17 2 21 1 24
a+ 16 7 3 10
a 15 7 18 25
a- 14 3 29 1 33
bbb+ 13 4 18 22
bbb 12 8 23 31
bbb- 11 13 16 29
bb+ 10 7 7
bb 9 10 2 12
bb- 8 2 2
b+ 7 7 1 8
b 6 1 1
b- 5
ccc+ 4





Banks 7 39 63 55 33 12 1 2 212
Legend
The mapping from the 9- to 21-Point Standalone Rating that was communicated by Fitch
XY The number of individual banks that transitioned
This table focuses on July 20, 2011, when Fitch announced the transition from 9-Point Standalone Ratings ("Individual Rating", on the horizontal axis) to 21-Point
Standalone Ratings ("Viability Rating", on the vertical axis). The grey boxes show the mapping from the 9-Point to the 21-Point Standalone Rating that was
communicated by Fitch prior to the announcement. The table is based on the 212 banks in the stock market sample.














Stock Reaction: Number of Banks (Per cent)
Positive Surprise 91 (43%) 35 (17%) 82 (39%) 43 (20%)
No Surprise 109 (51%) 174 (82%) 75 (35%) 137 (65%)
Negative Surprise 12 (6%) 3 (1%) 55 (26%) 32 (15%)
Total cases 212 (100%) 212 (100%) 212 (100%) 212 (100%)
Table V: Distribution of Rating Surprises
This table reports the distribution of rating surprises for the 212 banks across three categories: Positive Suprise (higher than expected), No Surpise (as expected), and
Negative Surprise (lower than expected). The first number in each cell reports the number of banks, while the second number (in parentheses) reports the percentage share 
in the sample. The rating surprises are calculated with respect to four benchmarks: Midpoint Map, Sovereign Support, Mean and Median of 21-Point Standalone, as
specified in Table III. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Rating Surprise for 
Bank Size  0.2846*** 0.2451*** 0.0834** 0.1024**
Fitch Securitization Share 0.4012 -0.3969* 0.0147 -0.1658
Sovereign Rating 0.0740* 0.0666**
Common Equity / Total Assets -2.5632 -2.5189
Return on Equity 0.9075 0.2617
Liquidity Ratio 1.1321** -0.3767
Short-term Funding -0.4191 -0.0361
Local Analyst Dummy -0.1948 -0.2006*
1=Asia 0.7334*** 0.3873**
1= Italy, Portugal, Spain 0.7363** -0.0316
1=Europe minus Italy, Portugal, Spain 0.3999** 0.0569
1=Rest of world 0.5888* 0.4920**
1=9-point standalone is low (C/D, D, D/E or E) 0.4830** 0.2557 0.5301*** 0.4271** 0.3559* 0.5411***
1=9-point standalone is high (A/B, B) -0.0651 0.2659* -0.1954 -0.2875*** -0.1869*** -0.3743***
Constant -2.7200*** 0.4091* -3.8222*** -0.7489* 0.1842*** -1.9640***
Number of Observations 212 212 212 212 212 212
R2 adjusted 0.217 0.021 0.279 0.133 0.087 0.224
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5)
Dependent Variable: Rating Surprise for
Bank Size  0.3123*** 0.2715*** 0.4080*** 0.3550***
Fitch Securitization Share 0.5158* -0.3350** 0.6720 -0.3579
Sovereign Rating 0.1044*** 0.0733
Common Equity / Total Assets -3.3524* -1.3417
Return on Equity 1.8226** 0.6166
Liquidity Ratio 1.4397*** 2.6038***
Short-term Funding -0.6579 -1.3174
Local Analyst Dummy -0.2777* -0.1798
1=Asia 0.7368*** 1.0332***
1= Italy, Portugal, Spain 0.6841** 1.4297***
1=Europe minus Italy, Portugal, Spain 0.4219** 0.5909*
1=Rest of world 0.6457** 1.2611**
1=9-point standalone is low (C/D, D, D/E or E) 0.2641 0.0180 0.4045** -0.4021 -0.7237** -0.4827
1=9-point standalone is high (A/B, B) -0.2774* 0.0833 -0.5131*** -2.4638*** -1.9925*** -2.4720***
Constant -3.5606*** -0.1374 -5.1725*** -3.8212** 0.6509 -5.2537***
Number of Observations 212 212 212 212 212 212
R2 adjusted 0.240 0.014 0.342 0.291 0.187 0.343
Table VI: Factors Explaining Rating Surprises
This table reports regressions of rating surprises on bank characteristics. The dependent variable is a proxy of the rating surprise calculated with respect to four
benchmarks: Midpoint Map, Sovereign Support, Mean of 21-Point Standalone Rating, and Ordinal Ranking. The former two are ex ante benchmarks and the
latter two are ex post benchmarks, calculated as indicated in Table III. The bank characteristics are defined in Table III. The regressions are estimated by
pooled OLS, with robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***,**, and * signify statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
Mean of 21-Point Standalone Ordinal Ranking
Sovereign SupportMidpoint Map
Rating Surprise for:
Obs Obs Obs Obs
Market Model-adjusted
Positive Surprise 91 0.7% 33 0.2% 82 0.9% 43 0.9%
No Surprise 109 -0.1% 176 0.2% 75 0.1% 137 0.1%
Negative Surprise 12 -1.3% 3 -4.4% 55 -0.8% 32 -0.3%
Positive Minus Negative Surprises 103 2.0% ** 36 4.6% ** 137 1.7% *** 75 1.2% **
P-value, two-tailed test 0.018 0.034 0.001 0.040
Mean-adjusted
Positive Surprise 91 3.9% 33 2.4% 82 4.1% 43 4.0%
No Surprise 109 1.7% 176 2.7% 75 2.2% 137 2.4%
Negative Surprise 12 0.7% 3 -3.5% 55 0.8% 32 1.7%
Positive Minus Negative Surprises 103 3.2% ** 36 5.9% ** 137 3.3% *** 75 2.3% **
P-value, two-tailed test 0.011 0.039 0.000 0.014
Size-adjusted
Positive Surprise 91 0.5% 33 -0.3% 82 0.7% 43 0.9%
No Surprise 109 -0.4% 176 0.1% 75 -0.2% 137 -0.3%
Negative Surprise 12 0.3% 3 -4.1% 55 -0.7% 32 0.1%
Positive Minus Negative Surprises 103 0.2% 36 3.8% * 137 1.4% ** 75 0.8%
P-value, two-tailed test 0.866 0.068 0.034 0.273
Market Model-adjusted
Positive Surprise 60 0.3% 26 -0.5% 54 0.5% 31 0.7%
No Surprise 87 -0.6% 130 -0.2% 55 -0.6% 100 -0.5%
Negative Surprise 12 -1.3% 3 -4.4% 50 -0.8% 28 -0.8%
Positive Minus Negative Surprises 72 1.6% ** 29 3.8% ** 104 1.3% ** 59 1.5% **
P-value, two-tailed test 0.025 0.011 0.014 0.019
Mean-adjusted
Positive Surprise 60 2.2% 26 0.8% 54 2.3% 31 2.4%
No Surprise 87 0.3% 130 1.2% 55 0.7% 100 0.7%
Negative Surprise 12 0.7% 3 -3.5% 50 0.1% 28 0.9%
Positive Minus Negative Surprises 72 1.5% 29 4.3% ** 104 2.2% *** 59 1.5% *
P-value, two-tailed test 0.134 0.012 0.002 0.073
Size-adjusted
Positive Surprise 60 -0.6% 26 -1.2% 54 -0.5% 31 0.0%
No Surprise 87 -1.4% 130 -0.8% 55 -1.2% 100 -1.4%
Negative Surprise 12 0.3% 3 -4.1% 50 -1.2% 28 -0.5%
Positive Minus Negative Surprises 72 -0.9% 29 2.9% ** 104 0.7% 59 0.5%
P-value, two-tailed test 0.347 0.034 0.269 0.519
Table VII: Univariate Tests
Mean of 21-Point StandaloneMidpoint Map Sovereign Support Ordinal Ranking
Panel B: Excluding European Banks
This table reports the equal-weighted stock returns for portfolios of banks that received rating surprises, either positive or negative, or no surprise. The rating surprises are
calculated with respect to four benchmarks: Midpoint Map, Sovereign Support, Mean of 21-Point Standalone Rating, and Ordinal Ranking. The former two are ex ante
benchmarks and the latter two ex post benchmarks, calculated as indicated in Table III. Cumulative abnormal returns are summed from 2 days before to 2 days after the
Fitch release on July 20, 2011. Abnormal returns are calculated using three approaches: Market model-adjusted, mean-adjusted and size-adjusted. Market model-adjusted
returns are based on regressions of daily bank stock returns on a country-specific stock market index, returns from the MSCI World Bank index, and a constant, over an
estimation window from 80 to 10 trading days prior to July 20, 2011. The mean-adjusted abnormal return is the actual stock return for a given bank minus the average daily
stock return for the same bank over an estimation window from 80 to 10 trading days prior to July 20, 2011. The size-adjusted abnormal return is the actual stock return for
a given bank minus the contemporaneous return of the equal-size decile portfolio of banks. ***,**, and * signify statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
CAR[-2,2] CAR[-2,2] CAR[-2,2] CAR[-2,2]
Panel A: Full Sample
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Positive Rating Surprise for Midpoint Map 0.0087** 0.0060 0.0025
Negative Rating Surprise for Midpoint Map -0.0115*** -0.0065*** -0.0013
Positive Rating Surprise for Sovereign Support 0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0047
Negative rating Surprise for Sovereign Support -0.0459*** -0.0469*** -0.0374***
Positive Rating Surprise for Mean of 21-Point Standalone 0.0083* 0.0066 0.0058
Negative Rating Surprise for Mean of 21-Point Standalone -0.0085** -0.0052 0.0021
Positive Rating Surprise for Ordinal Ranking 0.0084** 0.0085** 0.0067
Negative Rating Surprise for Ordinal Ranking -0.0037 0.0003 0.0003
Bank Size  0.0020 0.0021* 0.0020 0.0021*
Fitch Securitization Share 0.0066 0.0063 0.0072 0.0066
Sovereign Rating 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005
Common Equity / Total Assets -0.0878* -0.0895** -0.0892* -0.0880*
Return on Equity 0.0270** 0.0282** 0.0265* 0.0295**
Liquidity Ratio 0.0133 0.0175 0.0123 0.0111
Short-term Funding -0.0001 -0.0042 0.0001 0.0006
Local Analyst Dummy -0.0149*** -0.0150*** -0.0150*** -0.0144***
1=Asia 0.0036 0.0120** 0.0093** 0.0146*** 0.0036 0.0120** 0.0055 0.0116**
1=Italy, Portugal, Spain 0.0128*** 0.0085 0.0160*** 0.0088 0.0129*** 0.0084 0.0142*** 0.0077
1=Europe minus Italy, Portugal, Spain 0.0214*** 0.0160* 0.0248*** 0.0175** 0.0205*** 0.0157* 0.0241*** 0.0161*
1=Rest of world 0.0017 0.0093* 0.0037 0.0090* 0.0019 0.0098* 0.0020 0.0083*
1=9-point standalone is low (C/D, D, D/E or E) -0.0022 0.0016 -0.0024 0.0008
1=9-point standalone is high (A/B, B) -0.0029 -0.0031 -0.0031 -0.0006
Constant -0.0014 -0.0064*** -0.0283 0.0023 -0.0060*** -0.0282 0.0006 -0.0053** -0.0305 0.0005 -0.0071*** -0.0321
Number of Observations 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 212
R2 adjusted 0.027 0.074 0.103 0.026 0.096 0.124 0.044 0.085 0.109 0.009 0.074 0.108
Positive minus Negative Rating Surprise 2.0% 1.3% 0.4% 4.6% 4.6% 3.3% 1.7% 1.2% 0.4% 1.2% 0.8% 0.6%
P-value 0.0001 0.0001 0.3309 0.0001 0.0001 0.0016 0.0009 0.0195 0.5134 0.0323 0.1167 0.3154
Significance *** *** *** *** *** *** ** **
Positive Rating Surprise for Midpoint Map 0.0092*** 0.0088** 0.0035
Negative Rating Surprise for Midpoint Map -0.0070*** -0.0056*** 0.0025
Positive Rating Surprise for Sovereign Support -0.0039 -0.0062 -0.0082
Negative rating Surprise for Sovereign Support -0.0421*** -0.0481*** -0.0343***
Positive Rating Surprise for Mean of 21-Point Standalone 0.0105** 0.0099** 0.0074*
Negative Rating Surprise for Mean of 21-Point Standalone -0.0025 -0.0023 0.0067
Positive Rating Surprise for Ordinal Ranking 0.0116*** 0.0114*** 0.0091*
Negative Rating Surprise for Ordinal Ranking -0.0029 -0.0017 -0.0011
Bank Size  0.0032* 0.0032** 0.0036** 0.0032*
Fitch Securitization Share 0.0216** 0.0212** 0.0208** 0.0201*
Sovereign Rating 0.0003 0.0003 0.0006 0.0003
Common Equity / Total Assets -0.0304 -0.0473 -0.0427 -0.0295
Return on Equity 0.0242 0.0262* 0.0287 0.0287
Liquidity Ratio -0.0036 -0.0001 -0.0028 -0.0091
Short-term Funding 0.0260* 0.0205 0.0280* 0.0295*
Local Analyst Dummy -0.0091** -0.0099** -0.0097*** -0.0081**
1=Asia 0.0031 0.0099** 0.0102*** 0.0130*** 0.0033 0.0102** 0.0046 0.0080*
1=Rest of world 0.0016 0.0083** 0.0045 0.0087** 0.0020 0.0090** 0.0008 0.0053
1=9-point standalone is low (C/D, D, D/E or E) -0.0013 0.0034 -0.0013 0.0022
1=9-point standalone is high (A/B, B) -0.0020 -0.0026 -0.0038 0.0010
Constant -0.0059** -0.0073*** -0.0490* -0.0015 -0.0057*** -0.0461** -0.0057* -0.0073*** -0.0598* -0.0047* -0.0066*** -0.0501
Number of Observations 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159
R2 adjusted 0.025 0.015 0.083 0.035 0.047 0.115 0.032 0.022 0.096 0.022 0.015 0.095
Positive minus Negative Rating Surprise 1.6% 1.4% 0.1% 3.8% 4.2% 2.6% 1.3% 1.2% 0.1% 1.5% 1.3% 1.0%
P-value 0.0001 0.0001 0.7997 0.0001 0.0001 0.0011 0.012 0.0304 0.911 0.0004 0.0035 0.0699
Significance *** *** *** *** *** ** ** *** *** *
Table VIII: Multivariate Regressions of Stock Reaction to Rating Surprises Using Dummy Variables
This table reports regressions of abnormal bank stock returns on rating surprises and bank characteristics. The dependent variable is the market model-adjusted abnormal return from two days before to two days after July 20, 2011
CAR[-2,2]. The rating surprises are calculated with respect to four benchmarks: Midpoint Map, Sovereign Support, Mean of 21-Point Standalone Rating, and Ordinal Ranking. The former two are ex ante benchmarks and the
latter two are ex post benchmarks, calculated as indicated in Table III. There are two dummies for Positive Surprises and Negative Surprises. The reference case in each regression are banks with No Surprise. For each measure of
ratings surprise there are two specifications: a first regression with only the rating surprise, and a second that includes bank characteristics, defined in Table III. The regressions are estimated by pooled OLS, with robust standard
errors clustered by country. ***,**, and * signify statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Full Sample
Panel B: Excluding European Banks
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Rating Surprise for Midpoint Map 0.0071*** 0.0051*** 0.0024
Rating Surprise for Midpoint Map2 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0004
Rating Surprise for Sovereign Support 0.0117 0.0137 0.0062
Rating Surprise for Sovereign Support2 -0.0052 -0.0071 -0.0034
Rating Surprise for Mean of 21-Point Standalone 0.0073*** 0.0049*** 0.0021
Rating Surprise for Mean of 21-Point Standalone2 -0.0001 -0.0004 0.0001
Rating Surprise for Ordinal Ranking 0.0020** 0.0014 0.0011
Rating Surprise for Ordinal Ranking2 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002
Bank Size  0.0017 0.0021 0.0017 0.0020
Fitch Securitization Share 0.0066 0.0062 0.0066 0.0066
Sovereign Rating 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005
Common Equity / Total Assets -0.0871* -0.0872* -0.0846* -0.0888**
Return on Equity 0.0277** 0.0282** 0.0248* 0.0289**
Liquidity Ratio 0.0123 0.0155 0.0117 0.0112
Short-term Funding 0.0008 -0.0003 0.0003 0.0004
Local Analyst Dummy -0.0147*** -0.0147*** -0.0146*** -0.0147***
1=Asia 0.0031 0.0114** 0.0071* 0.0126** 0.0032 0.0115** 0.0054 0.0118**
1=Italy, Portugal, Spain 0.0123*** 0.0080 0.0161*** 0.0094 0.0120*** 0.0082 0.0140*** 0.0077
1=Europe minus Italy, Portugal, Spain 0.0207*** 0.0155* 0.0248*** 0.0167** 0.0197*** 0.0156* 0.0237*** 0.0159*
1=Rest of world 0.0012 0.0086* 0.0029 0.0089* 0.0010 0.0088* 0.0019 0.0085*
1=9-point standalone is low (C/D, D, D/E or E) -0.0024 -0.0016 -0.0022 0.0003
1=9-point standalone is high (A/B, B) -0.0027 -0.0025 -0.0019 -0.0004
Constant -0.0018 -0.0060*** -0.0256 0.0011 -0.0065*** -0.0293 0.0020 -0.0030 -0.0229 0.0007 -0.0065*** -0.0304
Number of Observations 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 212
R2 adjusted 0.0343 0.0778 0.1041 0.0006 0.0721 0.1032 0.0474 0.0848 0.1043 0.0077 0.0712 0.1063
Rating Surprise for Midpoint Map 0.0059*** 0.0053*** 0.0015
Rating Surprise for Midpoint Map2 0.0002 0.0004 0.0001
Rating Surprise for Sovereign Support 0.0196*** 0.0222*** 0.0135**
Rating Surprise for Sovereign Support2 -0.0135*** -0.0161*** -0.0112**
Rating Surprise for Mean of 21-Point Standalone 0.0068*** 0.0064*** 0.0011
Rating Surprise for Mean of 21-Point Standalone2 0.0012 0.0013 0.0007
Rating Surprise for Ordinal Ranking 0.0025*** 0.0022*** 0.0019*
Rating Surprise for Ordinal Ranking2 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003
Bank Size  0.0030* 0.0031** 0.0033* 0.0031
Fitch Securitization Share 0.0208** 0.0213** 0.0206** 0.0204*
Sovereign Rating 0.0004 0.0002 0.0004 0.0003
Common Equity / Total Assets -0.0337 -0.0486 -0.0360 -0.0303
Return on Equity 0.0263 0.0247 0.0246 0.0283
Liquidity Ratio -0.0047 -0.0017 -0.0036 -0.0094
Short-term Funding 0.0272* 0.0245* 0.0260* 0.0297*
Local Analyst Dummy -0.0090** -0.0097** -0.0093*** -0.0083**
1=Asia 0.0027 0.0094** 0.0096** 0.0122*** 0.0033 0.0103** 0.0044 0.0081*
1=Rest of world 0.0014 0.0075** 0.0043 0.0085** 0.0018 0.0086** 0.0006 0.0054
1=9-point standalone is low (C/D, D, D/E or E) -0.0012 0.0020 -0.0008 0.0018
1=9-point standalone is high (A/B, B) -0.0019 -0.002 -0.0019 0.0016
Constant -0.0059*** -0.0071*** -0.0468 -0.0021 -0.0061*** -0.0440* -0.0028 -0.0046* -0.0502 -0.0044* -0.0062*** -0.0477
Number of Observations 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159
R2 adjusted 0.0307 0.0197 0.0817 0.0201 0.0293 0.1005 0.0318 0.0219 0.0804 0.0202 0.0127 0.0942
Table IX: Multivariate Regressions of Stock Reaction to Rating Surprises Using Continuous Variables
This table reports regressions of abnormal bank stock returns on rating surprises and bank characteristics. The dependent variable is the market model-adjusted abnormal return from two days before to two days after July 20, 2011
CAR[-2,2]. The rating surprises are calculated with respect to three benchmarks: Midpoint Map, Sovereign Support, Mean of 21-Point Standalone Rating. The former two are ex ante benchmarks and the latter is an ex post
benchmark, calculated as indicated in Table III. The regressions include a squared term for the ratings surprise to capture potential non-linearity. For each measure of ratings surprise there are two specifications: a first regression
with only the ratings surprise, and a second that includes bank characteristics, defined in Table III. The regressions are estimated by pooled OLS, with robust standard errors clustered by country. ***,**, and * signify statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Full Sample
Panel B: Excluding European Banks
Appendix 
Appendix A: Abnormal CDS Spread Changes? 
We start from the observation that, in line with Fitch’s own statement, the standalone rating 
transition was not associated with any all-in rating changes during the episode we focus on. Since 
it is the latter ratings that should matter to bank creditors, our hypothesis is: 
H3: The CDS spreads of banks experiencing positive rating surprises will outperform the CDS 
spreads of banks experiencing negative rating surprises. 
We study the CDS reaction to the announcement of 21-point standalone ratings using abnormal 
CDS spread changes. Given the similarity in methodology, Tables A.I to A.IX in this Appendix 
match Tables I to IX in the paper in line-up. 
We study the CDS reaction to the announcement of 21-point standalone ratings using abnormal 
CDS spread changes. Similar to the stock price reaction, we calculate abnormal CDS spread 
changes using market model-adjusted, mean-adjusted, and size-adjusted CDS changes. When 
measuring the market model-adjusted CDS changes, we regress a bank’s daily CDS spread 
change on the daily change in a national (or global) CDS market index, the daily change in each 
country’s 10-year government bond yield, the daily change in realized stock market volatility for 
each country (or the VIX if not available), and the daily change in 3-month LIBOR-OIS spreads 
for different regions. The mean-adjusted and size-adjusted abnormal CDS changes are calculated 
using the same methodology as abnormal stock returns but using CDS spreads instead. We 
calculate cumulative abnormal CDS changes (CACCs) by bank for the same three windows 
around the event, [0,1], [0,4], and [-2,2]. 
For our tests of the CDS spread reaction, we collect daily data on individual bank CDS contracts 
from Markit.1 We use the spread on the 5-year contract referencing the senior unsecured debt 
denominated in the reference entity’s home currency where available, or the more liquid of the 
U.S. dollar or Euro contract if the home currency is not available (see also Table A.I). We restrict 
the sample to banks with a liquid CDS contract. A CDS contract is considered liquid if over the 
two year window from 2010 to 2011 the CDS contract had fewer than 130 missing observations 
(or 25% of the days), and no more than 130 days with no change in the spread from the previous 
trading day. These restrictions lead to a sample of 74 banks with a liquid CDS contract out of the 
sample of 212 banks used for the stock reaction. This smaller sample size reduces the statistical 
power of our tests. The distribution is 12% from North America, 30% from Asia, 47% from 
Europe, and 11% from the rest of the world (see also Table A.II). Descriptive statistics for the 74 
banks are in Table A.III, while the Fitch transition from the 9-point to the 21-point standalone 
rating is in Table A.IV. 
[Insert Tables A.I to A.IV here] 
                                                            
1 We attempted to collect data on bank bond prices for our sample of banks. While we identified fixed-coupon bullet 
bonds for around half the banks in our sample using Bloomberg, these bonds issues varied by currency, amount 
outstanding, maturity, and rank. Given that our sample covers many countries, we were unable to find either traded 
prices or liquid quotes for these bond issues, nor could we establish liquid benchmarks against which to measure 
abnormal yield spreads. 
A.2 
 
The distribution of rating surprises based on the Midpoint Map and the Sovereign Support 
benchmarks is similar to that of the stock-market sample, except there are no cases of negative 
surprises (see Table A.V). Using the Mean of the 21-Point Standalone benchmark, there are 14% 
positive surprises vs. 46% negative surprises. For the Ordinal Ranking benchmark, there are 23% 
positive surprises and 70% negative surprises. Table A.VI then runs the same regressions as in 
Table VI for the 74 banks in the CDS sample. For the mean and ordinal ranking benchmarks the 
direction of the effects is as presented here in 3 out of 4 regressions, but we may lack the 
statistical power to draw any further inferences. This is even more likely to be the case when we 
exclude the European banks and the sample is reduced to only 39 observations. 
[Insert Tables A.V and A.VI here] 
We also test how bank creditors reacted to the release of more granular 21-point standalone 
ratings by examining the CDS spreads for 74 banks. Tables A.VII, A.VIII and A.IX repeat the 
earlier tests using cumulative abnormal changes in CDS spreads. The message is quite simple: 
there is no statistically significant difference between banks receiving positive surprises and 
banks receiving negative surprises. 
Table A.VII provides the univariate tests across the portfolios of banks using the four 
benchmarks for rating surprises and the three measures of abnormal CDS changes. We show the 
results for the five-day event window [-2,2], but the results are robust to other windows. If the 
Fitch private information has value for bank creditors, a positive rating surprise should be 
associated with a decline in the probability of default, leading to a decline in the CDS spread (i.e., 
a negative value). Unlike the stock reaction, where we see a clear pattern of banks with positive 
surprises outperforming banks with negative surprises, the CDS reaction shows no such pattern. 
Instead, we find that the abnormal CDS change is not statistically different between positive and 
negative surprises (or positive vs. no surprises) for 23 out of the 24 cases considered. 
[Insert Table A.VII here] 
The story is the same using the multivariate tests. Table A.VIII reports cross-sectional regressions 
using the dummy variables for positive and negative rating surprises, while Table A.IX reports 
results using the continuous measures of rating surprises and the squared term for detecting non-
linearity. In almost all cases, the coefficients on the variables measuring ratings surprises are not 
statistically different from zero. And in many cases, the specifications themselves do not explain 
any variation in abnormal CDS spreads over this event window, as seen by the negative adjusted-
R2. Statistical significance is even lower when excluding European banks, as the sample declines 
from 74 to only 39 banks. Thus, on the basis of the available data, we reject the third hypothesis 
(H3): there is no evidence that bank creditors react in a systematic fashion to publication of more 
granular 21-point standalone ratings. 
[Insert Table A.VIII and A.IX here] 
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Table A.I: Fitch Transition From 9- to 21-Point Standalone Ratings for 74 Banks in the CDS Sample
This table provides details on the 74 Banks with a CDS Contract that made Fitch's transition from 9-point standalone ratings ("Individual
Ratings") to 21-point standalone ratings ("Viability Ratings"). Column (1) shows the (ex ante) midpoint mapping for each of the 9-point
ratings. Column (2) shows the number of banks with liquid CDS. Column (3) to (6) display the mean, median, minimum and maximum















AUSTRALIA 5 5 6.8
AUSTRIA 2 2 2.7
BELGIUM 1 1 1.4
BRAZIL 2 2 2.7
CANADA 1 1 1.4
DENMARK 1 1 1.4
FRANCE 3 3 4.1
GERMANY 2 2 2.7
INDIA 3 3 4.1
ITALY 6 6 8.1
JAPAN 3 3 4.1
KOREA (SOUTH) 4 4 5.4
MALAYSIA 2 2 2.7
NETHERLANDS 1 1 1.4
NORWAY 1 1 1.4
PORTUGAL 2 2 2.7
QATAR 1 1 1.4
RUSSIA 1 1 1.4
SINGAPORE 3 3 4.1
SPAIN 5 5 6.8
SWEDEN 4 4 5.4
SWITZERLAND 2 2 2.7
THAILAND 2 2 2.7
TURKEY 3 3 4.1
UAE 1 1 1.4
UNITED KINGDOM 5 5 6.8
UNITED STATES 8 8 10.8
Total 9 22 35 8 74 100.0
Percent of Sample 12.2 29.7 47.3 10.8 100.0
Table A.II: Overview of the CDS Sample
This table provides details on the 74 banks in the final sample with a liquid credit default swap (CDS) contract. North American banks
represent 12% of the sample, Asian banks 30%, European banks 47%, and banks from the rest of the world 11%.
Variable Names Variable Definitions Point or Units Mean Minimum Median Maximum
Fitch Ratings ("Fitch Names")
9-Point Standalone Rating "Individual Rating", E to A, mapped into the 21-Point by midpoint 0-20 13.3 1.5 13.5 17.0
21-Point Standalone Rating "Viability Rating", c to aaa 0-20 14.3 3.0 14.0 18.0
All-in Rating "Issuer Default Rating", C to AAA 0-20 15.0 10.0 15.0 18.0
Support Rating Floor "Support Rating Floor", C to AAA 0-20 13.1 0.0 14.0 17.0
Sovereign Rating Rating of the sovereign nation where the bank is located 0-20 17.5 10.0 19.0 20.0
Ratings Surprises
Rating Surprise for Midpoint Map = 21-Point Standalone Rating – Midpoint Map Notches 0.9 0.0 1.0 3.5
Rating Surprise for Sovereign Support = 21-Point Standalone Rating – Min{All-in Rating, 9-Point Standalone Rating Midpoint} Notches 0.2 0.0 0.0 2.5
Rating Surprise for Mean = Actual 21-point standalone  – Mean of 21-point standalone rating Notches 0.3 -1.2 0.3 2.8
Rating Surprise for Ordinal Ranking = (21-Point Standalone for Bank A – mean 21-Point Standalone for Banks B)  –  
(9-Point Standalone for Bank A – mean 9-Point Standalone for Banks B) 
Bank Characteristics `
Bank Size  Natural logarithm of total assets US$ millions 12.7 9.8 12.7 14.8
Fitch Securitization Share Natural logarithm of all securitization business originated by a given bank and rated by Fitch over 
the period 2000 to 2010, where banks with no business receive a zero value
US$ millions 5.0 0.0 5.4 12.4
Common Equity / Total Assets Common equity divided by total assets Per cent 6.8% 2.0% 6.4% 18.8%
Return on Equity Net income divided by average shareholders’ equity Per cent 8.1% -14.9% 9.3% 23.8%
Liquidity Ratio Cash and marketable securities divided by customer deposits plus short and long-term debt Per cent 24.2% 4.4% 19.6% 73.5%
Short-term Funding Interbank borrowing plus short-term debt divided by interbank borrowing plus short-term debt and
long-term debt
Per cent 26.7% 2.9% 26.0% 61.4%
Local Analyst Dummy A dummy set to 1 if the Fitch analyst covering the bank is located in the same city 




[0,1] Cumulative abnormal return from July 20 to July 21, 2011 Per cent 1.7% -3.6% 1.3% 8.1%
[0,4] Cumulative abnormal return from July 20 to July 25, 2011 Per cent 0.8% -11.9% 0.2% 7.4%
[-2,2] Cumulative abnormal return from July 18 to July 22, 2011 Per cent 1.1% -5.0% 0.6% 6.6%
Mean-adjusted
[0,1] Cumulative abnormal return from July 20 to July 21, 2011 Per cent 5.5% -2.8% 4.4% 14.6%
[0,4] Cumulative abnormal return from July 20 to July 25, 2011 Per cent 4.2% -10.6% 4.2% 12.6%
[-2,2] Cumulative abnormal return from July 18 to July 22, 2011 Per cent 4.8% -6.5% 5.0% 13.1%
Size-adjusted
[0,1] Cumulative abnormal return from July 20 to July 21, 2011 Per cent 0.5% -5.9% -0.8% 10.6%
[0,4] Cumulative abnormal return from July 20 to July 25, 2011 Per cent 0.3% -14.0% 0.3% 7.1%
[-2,2] Cumulative abnormal return from July 18 to July 22, 2011 Per cent 0.5% -9.0% 0.3% 8.8%
Cumulative Abnormal CDS changes
Market Model-adjusted
[0,1] Cumulative abnormal CDS change from July 20 to July 21, 2011 Per cent -1.5% -11.3% -1.1% 8.7%
[0,4] Cumulative abnormal CDS change from July 20 to July 25, 2011 Per cent -3.9% -20.6% -3.2% 9.1%
[-2,2] Cumulative abnormal CDS change from July 18 to July 22, 2011 Per cent -2.8% -17.3% -2.1% 6.9%
Mean-adjusted
[0,1] Cumulative abnormal CDS change from July 20 to July 21, 2011 Per cent -7.0% -20.1% -6.6% 2.7%
[0,4] Cumulative abnormal CDS change from July 20 to July 25, 2011 Per cent -9.0% -29.0% -8.6% 9.7%
[-2,2] Cumulative abnormal CDS change from July 18 to July 22, 2011 Per cent -8.2% -26.8% -7.8% 2.3%
Size-adjusted
[0,1] Cumulative abnormal CDS change from July 20 to July 21, 2011 Per cent 0.0% -9.9% 0.6% 9.6%
[0,4] Cumulative abnormal CDS change from July 20 to July 25, 2011 Per cent 0.0% -14.3% 0.4% 13.5%
[-2,2] Cumulative abnormal CDS change from July 18 to July 22, 2011 Per cent 0.0% -11.7% 0.6% 9.5%
Table A.III: Descriptive Statistics for the CDS Sample
This table reports the variable names, definitions and the descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analysis involving 74 banks with a liquid credit default swap (CDS) contract. Fitch ratings are translated into a
numerical value according to the table in Appendix I, where the highest value corresponds to the highest rating category. The bank characteristics (except Securitization) are averages from 2008 to 2010 and are from
Bankscope.
9-Point Standalone Rating








aa 18 5 1 6
aa- 17 1 15 1 17
a+ 16 2 3 5
a 15 1 7 8
a- 14 12 12
bbb+ 13 1 5 6
bbb 12 8 8
bbb- 11 6 1 7
bb+ 10 2 2











Banks 6 19 24 19 4 1 1 74
Total 
Legend
The mapping from the 9- to 21-Point Standalone Rating that was communicated by Fitch
XY The number of individual banks that transitioned
Table A.IV: Fitch Transition From 9-Point To 21-Point Standalone Rating for the CDS Sample
This table shows the 9-Point Standalone Rating ("Individual Rating") on the horizontal axis and and expected 21-Point Standalone Rating ("Expected Viability Rating") on the
















Credit Default Swap Reaction: Number of Banks (Per cent)
Positive Surprise 40 (54%) 9 (12%) 10 (14%) 17 (23%)
No Surprise 34 (46%) 65 (88%) 30 (41%) 5 (7%)
Negative Surprise 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 34 (46%) 52 (70%)
Total cases 74 (100%) 74 (100%) 74 (100%) 74 (100%)
Table A.V: Distribution of Rating Surprises for the CDS Sample
This table reports the distribution of rating surprises for the 74 banks in the CDS sample across three categories: Positive Suprise (higher than expected), No Surpise (as
expected), and Negative Surprise (lower than expected). The first number in each cell reports the number of banks, while the second number (in parentheses) reports the
percentage share in the sample. The rating surprises are calculated with respect to four benchmarks: Midpoint Map, Sovereign Support, Mean and Median of 21-Point
Standalone, as specified in Table III. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Rating Surprise for 
Bank Size  0.2232** 0.4546*** 0.0703 0.1116
Fitch Securitization Share -0.1168 -0.7035 -0.0638 -0.1401
Sovereign Rating 0.0915** 0.0493
Common Equity / Total Assets 6.5458 -1.8435
Return on Equity 5.5118*** 1.7377
Liquidity Ratio 0.8333 -0.5487
Short-term Funding -0.0957 0.0547
Local Analyst Dummy 0.2947 0.1033
1=Asia 0.6944* 0.2794
1= Italy, Portugal, Spain 0.6608* -0.0562
1=Europe minus Italy, Portugal, Spain 0.5755* 0.1450
1=Rest of world -0.8358* -0.0130
1=9-point standalone is low (C/D, D, D/E or E) 0.4226 0.1642 1.0538** 0.7535* 0.6735 0.9121**
1=9-point standalone is high (A/B, B) 0.3345 0.5258*** -0.4470 -0.2229* -0.1627* -0.5189*
Constant -2.1247 0.7078*** -7.8862*** -0.7183 0.1810* -2.0502
Number of Observations 74 74 74 74 74 74
R2 adjusted 0.122 0.041 0.277 0.160 0.138 0.200
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5)
Dependent Variable: Rating Surprise for
Bank Size  0.2656** 0.4747** 0.3261* 0.7064**
Fitch Securitization Share 0.0844 -0.6440* -0.0338 -0.8959
Sovereign Rating 0.1360*** 0.1469*
Common Equity / Total Assets 6.3622 8.0275
Return on Equity 4.7954** 7.1874**
Liquidity Ratio 1.0607* 1.2954
Short-term Funding -0.5825 -1.0098
Local Analyst Dummy 0.1051 0.6326
1=Asia 0.8325** 1.0987
1= Italy, Portugal, Spain 0.7497** 1.3655**
1=Europe minus Italy, Portugal, Spain 0.6059* 0.7146
1=Rest of world -0.4370 -0.8167
1=9-point standalone is low (C/D, D, D/E or E) 0.3025 -0.0151 0.9373* -0.7001* -1.0837*** 0.1646
1=9-point standalone is high (A/B, B) 0.1310 0.3582** -0.6636** -1.7343*** -1.4552*** -2.7874***
Constant -3.1814** 0.1256 -9.3124*** -3.0038 1.0949*** -12.0780***
Number of Observations 74 74 74 74 74 74
R2 adjusted 0.131 0.002 0.279 0.208 0.154 0.275
Mean of 21-Point Standalone Ordinal Ranking
Table A.VI: Factors Explaining Rating Surprises for the CDS Sample
This table reports regressions of rating surprises on bank characteristics. The dependent variable is a proxy of the rating surprise. Rating surprises are
calculated with respect to four benchmarks: Midpoint Map, Sovereign Support, Mean and Median of 21-Point Standalone Ratings. The former two are ex ante
benchmarks and the latter two are ex post benchmarks, calculated as indicated in Table III. The bank characteristics are also defined in Table III. The
regressions are estimated by pooled OLS, with robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***,**, and * signify statistical significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels, respectively.
Midpoint Map Sovereign Support
Rating Surprise for:
Obs Obs Obs Obs
Market Model-adjusted
Positive Surprise 40 -3.1% 9 -1.0% 34 -2.7% 17 -1.9%
No Surprise 34 -2.5% 65 -3.1% 30 -2.9% 52 -3.0%
Negative Surprise 0 ---    0 ---    10 -3.0% 5 -3.8%
Positive Minus Negative Surprises n.a. n.a. 44 0.3% 22 1.9%
P-value, two-tailed test n.a. n.a. 0.861 0.384
Mean-adjusted
Positive Surprise 40 -8.9% 9 -5.6% 34 -8.7% 17 -7.7%
No Surprise 34 -7.5% 65 -8.6% 30 -8.3% 52 -8.8%
Negative Surprise 0 ---    0 ---    10 -6.2% 5 -4.6%
Positive Minus Negative Surprises n.a. n.a. 44 -2.5% 22 -3.1%
P-value, two-tailed test n.a. n.a. 0.315 0.338
Size-adjusted
Positive Surprise 40 0.6% 9 1.3% 34 0.8% 17 0.9%
No Surprise 34 -0.7% 65 -0.2% 30 -0.6% 52 -0.3%
Negative Surprise 0 ---    0 ---    10 -0.7% 5 0.2%
Positive Minus Negative Surprises n.a. n.a. 44 1.5% 22 0.7%
P-value, two-tailed test n.a. n.a. 0.419 0.768
Market Model-adjusted
Positive Surprise 19 -2.9% 5 -3.3% 16 -2.5% 9 -2.3%
No Surprise 20 -3.1% 34 -3.0% 15 -3.9% 27 -3.5%
Negative Surprise 0 ---    0 ---    8 -2.6% 3 -1.4%
Positive Minus Negative Surprises n.a. n.a. 24 0.1% 12 -0.9%
P-value, two-tailed test n.a. n.a. 0.966 0.570
Mean-adjusted
Positive Surprise 19 -4.7% 5 -4.8% 16 -4.3% 9 -4.2%
No Surprise 20 -5.0% 34 -4.9% 15 -6.2% 27 -5.4%
Negative Surprise 0 ---    0 ---    8 -3.4% 3 -1.6%
Positive Minus Negative Surprises n.a. n.a. 24 -0.9% 12 -2.6%
P-value, two-tailed test n.a. n.a. 0.607 0.246
Size-adjusted
Positive Surprise 19 3.2% 5 0.6% 16 3.3% 9 2.9%
No Surprise 20 0.5% 34 2.0% 15 0.9% 27 1.4%
Negative Surprise 0 ---    0 ---    8 0.7% 3 2.2%
Positive Minus Negative Surprises n.a. n.a. 24 2.6% ** 12 0.7%
P-value, two-tailed test n.a. n.a. 0.048 0.708
Table A.VII: Univariate Tests for the CDS Sample
This table reports the equally-weighted abnormal CDS changes for portfolios of banks that received rating surprises, either positive or negative, or no surprise. The rating
surprises are calculated with respect to four benchmarks: Midpoint Map, Sovereign Support, Mean and Median of 21-Point Standalone Ratings. The former two are ex ante
benchmarks and the latter two ex post benchmarks, calculated as indicated in Table III. Cumulative abnormal CDS changes (CACC) are summed from 2 days before to 2
days after the Fitch release on July 20, 2011. Abnormal CDS changes are calculated using three approaches: market model-adjusted, mean-adjusted and size-adjusted.
Market model-adjusted CDS changes are based on regressions of daily bank CDS changes on changes in a country-specific CDS index, changes in 10-year government
bond yields, changes in country-specific equity volatility, changes in Libor-OIS spreads, and a constant, over an estimation window from 80 to 10 trading days prior to July
20, 2011. The mean-adjusted abnormal CDS change is the actual CDS change for a given bank minus the average daily CDS change for the same bank over an estimation
window from 80 to 10 trading days prior to July 20, 2011. The size-adjusted abnormal CDS change is the actual CDS change for a given bank minus the contemporaneous
CDS change of the equal-size decile portfolio of banks. ***,**, and * signify statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
CACC[-2,2]
Midpoint Map Sovereign Support Mean of 21-Point Standalone Ordinal Ranking
Panel A: Full Sample
Panel B: Excluding European Banks
CACC[-2,2] CACC[-2,2] CACC[-2,2]
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Positive Rating Surprise for Midpoint Map -0.0062 0.0014
Negative Rating Surprise for Midpoint Map n.a. n.a.
Positive Rating Surprise for Sovereign Support 0.0395*** 0.0372*
Negative rating Surprise for Sovereign Support n.a. n.a.
Positive Rating Surprise for Mean of 21-Point Standalone 0.0026 0.0116
Negative Rating Surprise for Mean of 21-Point Standalone -0.0004 0.0147
Positive Rating Surprise for Ordinal Ranking 0.0109 -0.0123
Negative Rating Surprise for Ordinal Ranking -0.0074 0.0046
Bank Size  -0.0182 -0.0199 -0.0174 -0.0161
Fitch Securitization Share 0.0079 0.0090 0.0102 0.0042
Sovereign Rating 0.0068** 0.0057* 0.0077*** 0.0074**
Common Equity / Total Assets -0.4521 -0.3788 -0.4790 -0.4288
Return on Equity -0.0538 -0.0817 -0.0522 -0.0265
Liquidity Ratio -0.0545 -0.0417 -0.0540 -0.0488
Short-term Funding -0.0197 -0.0156 -0.0266 -0.0228
Local Analyst Dummy 0.0332** 0.0319** 0.0302** 0.0353**
1=Asia -0.0394 -0.0456* -0.0354 -0.0355
1=Italy, Portugal, Spain -0.0139 -0.0116 -0.0112 -0.0093
1=Europe minus Italy, Portugal, Spain -0.0282 -0.0303 -0.0287 -0.0258
1=Rest of world -0.0117 -0.0148 -0.0018 -0.0164
1=9-point standalone is low (C/D, D, D/E or E) -0.0295 -0.0481 -0.0282 -0.0297
1=9-point standalone is high (A/B, B) -0.0334 -0.0227 -0.0366 -0.0424
Constant -0.0249** 0.1534 -0.0320*** 0.1861 -0.0295*** 0.1234 -0.0303*** 0.1169
Number of Observations 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74
R2 adjusted -0.010 0.093 0.043 0.132 -0.027 0.092 -0.017 0.087
Positive minus Negative Rating Surprise n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.3% -0.3% 1.8% -1.7%
P-value 0.8721 0.8826 0.3189 0.3884
Significance
Positive Rating Surprise for Midpoint Map 0.0019 0.0112
Negative Rating Surprise for Midpoint Map n.a. n.a.
Positive Rating Surprise for Sovereign Support 0.0230** 0.0146
Negative rating Surprise for Sovereign Support n.a. n.a.
Positive Rating Surprise for Mean of 21-Point Standalone 0.0143 0.0237
Negative Rating Surprise for Mean of 21-Point Standalone 0.0136 0.0199
Positive Rating Surprise for Ordinal Ranking 0.0112 0.0182
Negative Rating Surprise for Ordinal Ranking 0.0206 0.0269
Bank Size  -0.0227 -0.0189 -0.0171 -0.0134
Fitch Securitization Share -0.0313 -0.0346 -0.0415 -0.0450
Sovereign Rating -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0019 -0.0005
Common Equity / Total Assets -0.2437 -0.1230 -0.2423 -0.0458
Return on Equity -0.3623* -0.3221** -0.3485** -0.3645*
Liquidity Ratio -0.0891 -0.0667 -0.0984 -0.0870
Short-term Funding 0.1149 0.1025 0.1135 0.1039
Local Analyst Dummy 0.0176 0.0193 0.0147 0.0210
1=Asia -0.0669** -0.0615* -0.0588 -0.0586
1=Rest of world -0.0267 -0.0337 -0.0136 -0.0239
1=9-point standalone is low (C/D, D, D/E or E) -0.0491 -0.0445 -0.0400 -0.0277
1=9-point standalone is high (A/B, B) 0.0090 0.0148 -0.0017 0.0156
Constant -0.0314** 0.3362 -0.0322*** 0.2736 -0.0392*** 0.2264 -0.0346*** 0.2033
Number of Observations 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
R2 adjusted -0.026 -0.051 -0.003 -0.056 -0.024 -0.032 -0.026 -0.049
Positive minus Negative Rating Surprise n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.1% 0.4% -0.9% -0.9%
P-value 0.9749 0.8835 0.4463 0.6855
Significance
Panel A: Full Sample
Panel B: Excluding European Banks
Table A.VIII: Multivariate Regressions of CDS Reactions to Rating Surprises Using Dummy Variables
This table reports regressions of abnormal bank stock returns on rating surprises and bank characteristics. The dependent variable is the market model-adjusted abnormal return from two days
before to two days after July 20, 2011 CACC[-2,2]. The rating surprises are calculated with respect to four benchmarks: Midpoint Map, Sovereign Support, Mean and Median of 21-Point
Standalone Rating. The former two are ex ante benchmarks and the latter two are ex post benchmarks, calculated as indicated in Table III. There are two dummies for Positive Surprises and
Negative Surprises. The reference case in each regression are banks with No Surprise. For each measure of ratings surprise there are two specifications: a first regression with only the rating
surprise, and a second that includes bank characteristics, defined in Table III. The regressions are estimated by pooled OLS, with robust standard errors clustered by country. ***,**, and *
signify statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Rating Surprise for Midpoint Map -0.0168 -0.0044
Rating Surprise for Midpoint Map2 0.0079* 0.0033
Rating Surprise for Sovereign Support 0.0323** 0.0223
Rating Surprise for Sovereign Support2 -0.0053 -0.0004
Rating Surprise for Mean of 21-Point Standalone 0.0002 -0.0006
Rating Surprise for Mean of 21-Point Standalone2 0.0028 0.0032
Rating Surprise for Ordinal Ranking 0.0033 -0.0025
Rating Surprise for Ordinal Ranking2 0.0003 -0.0004
Bank Size  -0.0187 -0.0202 -0.0181 -0.0161
Fitch Securitization Share 0.0082 0.0102 0.0079 0.0037
Sovereign Rating 0.0066** 0.0058* 0.0070** 0.0074**
Common Equity / Total Assets -0.4532 -0.4052 -0.4501 -0.4273
Return on Equity -0.0659 -0.0869 -0.0623 -0.0258
Liquidity Ratio -0.0534 -0.0419 -0.0514 -0.0491
Short-term Funding -0.0273 -0.0214 -0.0307 -0.0216
Local Analyst Dummy 0.0328** 0.0313** 0.0322** 0.0354**
1=Asia -0.0396 -0.0448 -0.0380 -0.0363
1=Italy, Portugal, Spain -0.0134 -0.0119 -0.0120 -0.0097
1=Europe minus Italy, Portugal, Spain -0.0284 -0.0308 -0.0277 -0.0259
1=Rest of world -0.0107 -0.0122 -0.0093 -0.0169
1=9-point standalone is low (C/D, D, D/E or E) -0.0302 -0.0483 -0.0288 -0.0295
1=9-point standalone is high (A/B, B) -0.0299 -0.0223 -0.0312 -0.0423
Constant -0.0257** 0.1644 -0.0320*** 0.1907 -0.0305*** 0.1485 -0.0308*** 0.1176
Number of Observations 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74
R2 adjusted -0.0097 0.0823 0.0291 0.1196 -0.0233 0.0824 -0.013 0.0855
Rating Surprise for Midpoint Map 0.0152 0.0104
Rating Surprise for Midpoint Map2 -0.0077 -0.0013
Rating Surprise for Sovereign Support 0.0640*** 0.0665
Rating Surprise for Sovereign Support2 -0.0295*** -0.0352
Rating Surprise for Mean of 21-Point Standalone 0.0001 0.0028
Rating Surprise for Mean of 21-Point Standalone2 -0.0013 0.0067
Rating Surprise for Ordinal Ranking -0.0012 -0.0015
Rating Surprise for Ordinal Ranking2 0.0017* 0.0028
Bank Size  -0.0229 -0.0181 -0.0199 -0.0134
Fitch Securitization Share -0.0346 -0.0352 -0.0464* -0.0464
Sovereign Rating 0.0000 -0.0010 0.0006 -0.0007
Common Equity / Total Assets -0.2499 -0.0836 -0.2118 -0.0591
Return on Equity -0.3705* -0.3290** -0.3689** -0.3873*
Liquidity Ratio -0.0926 -0.0663 -0.0868 -0.0929
Short-term Funding 0.1161 0.1112 0.0981 0.1032
Local Analyst Dummy 0.0177 0.0181 0.0193 0.0194
1=Asia -0.0683* -0.0622* -0.0653* -0.0598
1=Rest of world -0.0259 -0.0387 -0.0273 -0.0213
1=9-point standalone is low (C/D, D, D/E or E) -0.0518 -0.0309 -0.0464 -0.0273
1=9-point standalone is high (A/B, B) 0.0094 0.0178 0.0101 0.0184
Constant -0.0323** 0.3402 -0.0322*** 0.2738 -0.0295*** 0.2909 -0.0347*** 0.2116
Number of Observations 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
R2 adjusted -0.0448 -0.0862 -0.0260 -0.0947 -0.0548 -0.0859 -0.0265 -0.0411
Panel A: Full Sample
Panel B: Excluding European Banks
Table A.IX: Multivariate Regressions of CDS Reactions to Rating Surprises Using Continuous Variables
This table reports regressions of abnormal CDS changes on rating surprises and bank characteristics. The dependent variable is the market model-adjusted abnormal CDS change from
two days before to two days after July 20, 2011, CAR[-2,2]. The rating surprises are calculated with respect to four benchmarks: Midpoint Map, Sovereign Support, Mean and Median of
21-Point Standalone Rating. The former two are ex ante benchmarks and the latter two ex post benchmarks, calculated as indicated in Table III. The regressions include a squared term
for the ratings surprise to capture potential non-linearity. For each measure of ratings surprise there are two specifications: a first regression with only the ratings surprise, and a second
that includes bank characteristics, defined in Table III. The regressions are estimated by pooled OLS, with robust standard errors clustered by country. ***,**, and * signify statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Bank Name Country CAR[-2,2]
Astoria Financial Corporation UNITED STATES -11.7%
Bank of Ayudhya Public Company Limited THAILAND -7.9%
PT Bank OCBC NISP Tbk INDONESIA -6.7%
State Street Corporation UNITED STATES -6.1%
First Interstate BancSystem, Inc. UNITED STATES -6.0%
Popular, Inc. UNITED STATES -5.6%
Kuwait Finance House KUWAIT -5.5%
New York Community Bancorp, Inc. UNITED STATES -5.3%
Sekerbank T.A.S. TURKEY -5.0%
Synovus Financial Corp. UNITED STATES -5.0%
Sberbank of Russia RUSSIA -5.0%
Commerzbank AG GERMANY -4.8%
People's United Financial, Inc. UNITED STATES -4.8%
Krung Thai Bank Public Company Limited THAILAND -4.7%
Emirates NBD PJSC UAE -4.4%
Cathay General Bancorp UNITED STATES -4.3%
PT Bank Internasional Indonesia Tbk INDONESIA -4.0%
Huntington Bancshares Incorporated UNITED STATES -3.7%
Bank Millennium POLAND -3.6%
First Commonwealth Financial Corporation UNITED STATES -3.4%
Banif - Banco Internacional do Funchal, S.A. PORTUGAL -3.4%
First Horizon National Corporation UNITED STATES -3.2%
Asya Katilim Bankasi A.S. TURKEY -3.2%
Zions Bancorporation UNITED STATES -2.9%
TCF Financial Corporation UNITED STATES -2.8%
Appendix B: Individual Bank 5-Day CARS
This table reports the equal-weighted stock returns for individual banks. Cumulative abnormal returns are summed
from 2 days before to 2 days after the Fitch release on July 20, 2011. Abnormal returns are market model-adjusted, i.e.,
abnormal returns are based on regressions of daily bank stock returns on a country-specific stock market index, returns
from the MSCI World Bank index, and a constant, over an estimation window from 80 to 10 trading days prior to July
20, 2011.
Standard Chartered Plc UNITED KINGDOM -2.8%
PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. UNITED STATES -2.8%
Doral Financial Corporation UNITED STATES -2.8%
Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi T.A.O. TURKEY -2.7%
First Niagara Financial Group, Inc. UNITED STATES -2.7%
Mega International Commercial Bank Company Limited TAIWAN -2.7%
PT Bank CIMB Niaga Tbk INDONESIA -2.4%
Old National Bancorp UNITED STATES -2.2%
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank UAE -2.1%
PT Bank Central Asia Tbk INDONESIA -2.1%
Hua Nan Commercial Bank TAIWAN -1.9%
Corpbanca CHILE -1.8%
Banca Popolare dell'Emilia Romagna ITALY -1.8%
Taishin Financial Holdings Company TAIWAN -1.7%
SinoPac Financial Holdings TAIWAN -1.7%
National Bank of Canada CANADA -1.7%
KBC Bank BELGIUM -1.7%
Banco de Credito e Inversiones CHILE -1.7%
Bank of Nova Scotia CANADA -1.6%
Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo SPAIN -1.6%
First Gulf Bank UAE -1.5%
Union National Bank UAE -1.5%
UMB Financial Corp. UNITED STATES -1.4%
Nedbank Group Limited SOUTH AFRICA -1.4%
Chong Hing Bank Limited HONG KONG -1.4%
Siam Commercial Bank Public Company Limited THAILAND -1.3%
ING Bank NV NETHERLANDS -1.3%
UniCredit S.p.A. ITALY -1.3%
Community Bank System, Inc. UNITED STATES -1.3%
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA) SPAIN -1.3%
Dime Community Bancshares, Inc. UNITED STATES -1.3%
First Midwest Bancorp, Inc. UNITED STATES -1.2%
Turkiye Is Bankasi A.S. TURKEY -1.2%
Qatar National Bank QATAR -1.2%
ICICI Bank Ltd. INDIA -1.2%
United Overseas Bank SINGAPORE -1.2%
Korea Exchange Bank KOREA (SOUTH) -1.1%
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (The) UNITED STATES -1.0%
Independent Bank Corp UNITED STATES -1.0%
Standard Bank Group Limited SOUTH AFRICA -0.9%
Chang Hwa Bank TAIWAN -0.9%
Washington Federal Inc. UNITED STATES -0.9%
Intesa Sanpaolo ITALY -0.9%
Malayan Banking Berhad MALAYSIA -0.8%
Banco Comercial Portugues PORTUGAL -0.8%
DBS Bank Ltd. SINGAPORE -0.8%
Cullen/Frost Bankers, Inc. UNITED STATES -0.8%
Hong Leong Bank Berhad MALAYSIA -0.8%
BOK Financial Corp. UNITED STATES -0.7%
Washington Trust Bank UNITED STATES -0.7%
Shizuoka Bank, Ltd. (The) JAPAN -0.6%
Bank of America Corporation UNITED STATES -0.6%
FirstMerit Corporation UNITED STATES -0.4%
Banco Santander SPAIN -0.4%
Trustmark Corporation UNITED STATES -0.3%
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce CANADA -0.3%
Wing Hang Bank Limited HONG KONG -0.3%
Toronto-Dominion Bank (The) CANADA -0.2%
Bank of Montreal CANADA -0.2%
National Bank Of Kuwait KUWAIT -0.2%
Chelindbank RUSSIA -0.1%
Commercial Bank of Qatar QATAR -0.1%
Suruga Bank Ltd. JAPAN -0.1%
Bank Hapoalim B.M. ISRAEL 0.0%
Taiwan Cooperative Bank TAIWAN 0.0%
OP-Pohjola Group FINLAND 0.0%
Commercial Bank of Kuwait KUWAIT 0.0%
Woori Bank KOREA (SOUTH) 0.0%
Deutsche Bank AG GERMANY 0.0%
Lloyds Banking Group plc UNITED KINGDOM 0.0%
SpareBank 1 Nord-Norge NORWAY 0.0%
Kuwait International Bank KUWAIT 0.0%
Investec Limited SOUTH AFRICA 0.0%
First Republic Bank UNITED STATES 0.0%
Arab National Bank SAUDI ARABIA 0.0%
Gulf Bank KUWAIT 0.0%
CIMB Bank Berhad MALAYSIA 0.0%
IDBI Bank Ltd. INDIA 0.0%
Mashreqbank UAE 0.0%
Bank Zenit RUSSIA 0.0%
Banque Saudi Fransi SAUDI ARABIA 0.0%
Hana Bank KOREA (SOUTH) 0.0%
Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp SAUDI ARABIA 0.0%
Royal Bank of Scotland plc (The) UNITED KINGDOM 0.0%
DnB NOR Bank NORWAY 0.0%
Axis Bank Ltd. INDIA 0.0%
Sumitomo Trust & Banking Company JAPAN 0.0%
Commonwealth Bank of Australia AUSTRALIA 0.0%
Unione di Banche Italiane Scpa - UBI Banca ITALY 0.1%
Regions Financial Corp. UNITED STATES 0.2%
Grupo Financiero Banorte MEXICO 0.2%
Qatar Islamic Bank QATAR 0.3%
Capital One Financial Corporation UNITED STATES 0.3%
Royal Bank of Canada CANADA 0.4%
SAMBA Financial Group SAUDI ARABIA 0.4%
Bank Leumi Le-Israel B.M. ISRAEL 0.5%
Deutsche Postbank AG GERMANY 0.5%
Banco de Chile CHILE 0.5%
HSBC Holdings plc UNITED KINGDOM 0.5%
Riyad Bank SAUDI ARABIA 0.6%
Credit Suisse AG SWITZERLAND 0.6%
Bank of Hawaii Corp UNITED STATES 0.7%
FirstRand Bank Limited SOUTH AFRICA 0.7%
Webster Financial Corporation UNITED STATES 0.7%
Erste Group Bank AG AUSTRIA 0.9%
Bank of New York Mellon (The) UNITED STATES 0.9%
Banco Bradesco S.A. BRAZIL 0.9%
Mizuho Trust & Banking Co., Ltd. JAPAN 0.9%
Nomura Holdings, Inc. JAPAN 1.0%
Canara Bank INDIA 1.0%
UBS AG SWITZERLAND 1.0%
Fulton Financial Corporation UNITED STATES 1.0%
BNP Paribas FRANCE 1.0%
Comerica Incorporated UNITED STATES 1.0%
East West Bancorp, Inc. UNITED STATES 1.1%
Banco Popolare ITALY 1.1%
Mizuho Financial Group, Inc. JAPAN 1.1%
BB&T Corporation UNITED STATES 1.1%
Thanachart Bank Public Company Limited THAILAND 1.1%
Banca Carige ITALY 1.1%
State Bank of India INDIA 1.1%
Citigroup Inc. UNITED STATES 1.2%
Central Pacific Financial Corp UNITED STATES 1.2%
Bank of Queensland AUSTRALIA 1.2%
Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and Banking Corporation JAPAN 1.3%
Daiwa Securities Group Inc. JAPAN 1.3%
Barclays plc UNITED KINGDOM 1.3%
Banca Popolare di Sondrio ITALY 1.3%
Associated Banc-Corp. UNITED STATES 1.3%
Bangkok Bank Public Company Limited THAILAND 1.3%
Australia & New Zealand Banking Group AUSTRALIA 1.4%
SpareBank 1 SMN NORWAY 1.4%
SpareBank 1 SR-Bank NORWAY 1.5%
Westpac Banking Corporation AUSTRALIA 1.5%
SunTrust Banks, Inc. UNITED STATES 1.6%
Macquarie Group Limited AUSTRALIA 1.7%
Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. TURKEY 1.8%
Aareal Bank AG GERMANY 1.8%
Saudi British Bank SAUDI ARABIA 1.8%
Dubai Islamic Bank UAE 1.8%
Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group, Inc. JAPAN 1.9%
PT Bank Pan Indonesia Tbk INDONESIA 2.0%
Turkiye Garanti Bankasi A.S. TURKEY 2.0%
Punjab National Bank INDIA 2.0%
Northern Trust Corporation UNITED STATES 2.1%
Fifth Third Bancorp UNITED STATES 2.1%
Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp SINGAPORE 2.2%
Banco de Valencia SPAIN 2.3%
Landesbank Berlin AG GERMANY 2.3%
M&T Bank Corporation UNITED STATES 2.4%
Bank VTB (JSC) RUSSIA 2.4%
JPMorgan Chase & Co. UNITED STATES 2.4%
Societe Generale FRANCE 2.5%
KeyCorp UNITED STATES 2.7%
Banco BPI PORTUGAL 2.7%
Sterling Financial Corporation UNITED STATES 2.8%
Sparebanken Vest NORWAY 3.1%
Banco do Brasil S.A. BRAZIL 3.2%
Banca Popolare di Milano ITALY 3.2%
Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited AUSTRALIA 3.3%
Bank of Baroda INDIA 3.4%
National Bank Of Abu Dhabi UAE 3.5%
Shinhan Bank KOREA (SOUTH) 3.5%
Svenska Handelsbanken SWEDEN 3.6%
Itau Unibanco Holding S.A. BRAZIL 3.6%
Akbank T.A.S. TURKEY 3.7%
Credit Agricole FRANCE 3.8%
First Financial Holding Company Limited TAIWAN 3.9%
National Australia Bank Limited AUSTRALIA 3.9%
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken SWEDEN 4.0%
Banco Popular Espanol S.A. SPAIN 4.1%
Nordea Bank AB SWEDEN 4.3%
Banco de Sabadell SPAIN 4.4%
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA ITALY 4.5%
CapitalSource Bank UNITED STATES 4.6%
Wells Fargo & Co. UNITED STATES 4.6%
CVB Financial Corp. UNITED STATES 4.7%
Danske Bank DENMARK 4.7%
Raiffeisen Bank International AG AUSTRIA 4.7%
Credem - Credito Emiliano S.p.A. ITALY 5.3%
EFG International SWITZERLAND 5.7%
U.S. Bancorp UNITED STATES 6.1%
Kasikornbank Public Company Limited THAILAND 6.2%
Morgan Stanley UNITED STATES 6.2%
Swedbank AB SWEDEN 6.6%
Hellenic Bank Public Company Limited CYPRUS 9.8%
Belfius Bank SA/NV (Dexia Bank Belgium) BELGIUM 12.0%
Asia 0.04%
Europe 1.54%
Rest of World -0.26%
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AAA 20 aaa 20
AA+ 19 A 19.0 aa+ 19
AA 18 aa 18
AA- 17 A/B 17.0 aa- 17
A+ 16 B 15.5 a+ 16
A 15 a 15
A- 14 B/C 13.5 a- 14
BBB+ 13 bbb+ 13
BBB 12 C 11.5 bbb 12
BBB- 11 bbb- 11
BB+ 10 C/D 9.5 bb+ 10
BB 9 bb 9
BB- 8 bb- 8
B+ 7 D 7.0 b+ 7
B 6 b 6
B- 5 D/E 5.0 b- 5
ccc+ 4
CCC 3 ccc 3
E 1.5 ccc- 2
CC 1 cc 1
C 0 F 0.0 c 0
Appendix C: Fitch Rating Point and Numerical Values Assigned
9-Point Standalone Rating 21-Point Standalone Rating
Individual Rating Viability Rating
All-in Rating
Issuer Default Rating
This appendix reports the numerical values assigned to each of the Fitch’s ratings in this study. The value of a 9-Point Standalone
Rating ("Individual Rating") is set equal to the midpoint of the corresponding range on the 21-Point Standalone Rating ("Viability
Rating"), based on a mapping published by Fitch prior to the transition. In this mapping, a 9-Point Standalone Rating translates
into one of several possible 21-Point Standalone Ratings, reflecting the combination of qualitative and quantitative factors
employed by Fitch to derive a standalone rating.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
21-Point Standalone Rating (1) 1.0000
9-Point Standalone Rating, Midpoint Map (2) 0.9442* 1.0000
All-in Rating (3) 0.8088* 0.7142* 1.0000
Support Rating Floor (4) 0.3506* 0.1799* 0.6350* 1.0000
Rating Surprise for Midpoint Map (5) 0.2772* -0.0331 0.3390* 0.5070* 1.0000
Rating Surprise for Sovereign Support (6) -0.1836* -0.3444* 0.0416 0.2146* 0.4557* 1.0000
Rating Surprise for Mean of 21-Point Standalone (7) 0.3557* 0.0288 0.4184* 0.5482* 0.9297* 0.4121* 1.0000
Rating Surprise for Ordinal Ranking (8) 0.0534 -0.1937* 0.0809 0.3322* 0.7157* 0.2896* 0.7203* 1.0000
Ln(Assets) (9) 0.5460* 0.4165* 0.6129* 0.6407* 0.4273* 0.0684 0.4693* 0.1960* 1.0000
Fitch Securitization Share % (10) 0.1285* 0.0799 0.2203* 0.2342* 0.1245* -0.0210 0.1622* 0.0910 0.4532* 1.0000
Sovereign Rating (11) 0.4391* 0.4466* 0.4840* -0.0894 -0.0041 0.0017 0.0561 -0.1682* 0.2037* 0.2011* 1.0000
Common Equity / Total Assets (12) -0.1927* -0.0870 -0.2262* -0.3192* -0.3162* -0.1515* -0.3276* -0.0652 -0.5261* -0.2880* -0.2067* 1.0000
Return on Equity (13) 0.2696* 0.2582* 0.2142* 0.2774* 0.0569 -0.0915 0.0932 0.0457 -0.0103 -0.1636* -0.4052* 0.2179* 1.0000
Liquidity Ratio (14) 0.2558* 0.1629* 0.2796* 0.4054* 0.2882* -0.0611 0.3126* 0.1824* 0.4157* 0.1462* -0.0377 -0.1537* 0.0764 1.0000
Short-term Funding % (15) 0.2896* 0.1928* 0.4351* 0.4963* 0.3029* 0.0839 0.3250* 0.0917 0.6135* 0.3215* 0.2162* -0.5002* -0.0537 0.4531* 1.0000
Local Analyst Dummy (16) -0.0376 -0.0611 -0.0058 0.2591* 0.0906 -0.0630 0.0627 0.1543* 0.1708* -0.0699 -0.3327* -0.0851 0.1730* 0.2921* 0.0990 1.0000
Appendix D: Correlation Coefficients
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Market Model-adjusted [0,1] (1) 1.0000
[0,4] (2) 0.6453* 1.0000
[-2,2] (3) 0.6324* 0.6526* 1.0000
Mean-adjusted [0,1] (4) 0.7566* 0.3965* 0.4250* 1.0000
[0,4] (5) 0.6126* 0.7542* 0.5501* 0.7803* 1.0000
[-2,2] (6) 0.5740* 0.4595* 0.6982* 0.7979* 0.7812* 1.0000
Size-adjusted [0,1] (7) 0.6906* 0.3346* 0.3586* 0.8670* 0.6433* 0.6653* 1.0000
[0,4] (8) 0.4991* 0.7525* 0.4815* 0.5752* 0.8721* 0.6076* 0.6679* 1.0000
[-2,2] (9) 0.4636* 0.4104* 0.6545* 0.6195* 0.6330* 0.8790* 0.7132* 0.6872* 1.0000
Cumulative Abnormal CDS Spread Changes (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Market Model-adjusted [0,1] (1) 1.0000
[0,4] (2) 0.5917* 1.0000
[-2,2] (3) 0.5418* 0.5340* 1.0000
Mean-adjusted [0,1] (4) 0.2532* 0.4255* 0.1555 1.0000
[0,4] (5) 0.1997* 0.7505* 0.2616* 0.8116* 1.0000
[-2,2] (6) 0.0973 0.4082* 0.5808* 0.7759* 0.7294* 1.0000
Size-adjusted [0,1] (7) 0.2982* 0.3507* 0.0667 0.7984* 0.6406* 0.5284* 1.0000
[0,4] (8) 0.1709 0.6523* 0.2181* 0.6057* 0.8234* 0.5473* 0.7442* 1.0000
[-2,2] (9) 0.0603 0.3076* 0.5834* 0.4893* 0.5254* 0.7972* 0.6070* 0.6297* 1.0000
Appendix E: Correlation Coefficients
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